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 SUMMARY TABLE 
 2007 2008 2009(f) 1 2010(f) 
 
OUTPUT 
 
(Real Annual Growth %)     
Private Consumer Expenditure 5.9 -1.0 -7 -1 
Public Net Current Expenditure 6.9 2.6 -1 ½ -3 
Investment 2.1 -15.5 -30 ¼ -17 ½ 
Exports 8.6 -1.0 -2 ¾ 1 ½ 
Imports 5.6 -2.1 -9 ½ -2 ½ 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 6.0 -3.0 -7 ¼ - ¼ 
Gross National Product (GNP) 4.4 -2.8 -10 -1 ½ 
GNP per capita (constant prices) 2.0 -4.6 -10 ¾ -1 ½ 
 
PRICES 
 
(Annual Growth %)     
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 2.8 3.3 -1 ¾ -1 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 4.9 4.1 -4 ½ - ½ 
Wage Growth 3.5 3.5 -1 -2 ½ 
 
LABOUR MARKET     
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 2,123 2,100 1,930 1,854 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 101 141 258 298 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 4.6 6.3 11 ¾ 13 ¾ 
 
PUBLIC FINANCE     
Exchequer Balance (€m) -1,619 -12,714 -25,261 -18,161 
General Government Balance (€m) 346 -13,037 -19,260 -18,560 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) 0.2 -7.2 -11 ¾ -11 ½ 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 25.1 44.2 65 ¼ 78 
 
EXTERNAL TRADE     
Balance of Payments Current Account (€m) -10,128 -9,439 -3,277 787 
Current Account (% of GNP) -6.3 -6.1 -2 ½ ½ 
 
EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATES      
US$/€ Exchange Rate (annual average) 1.39 1.47 1.40 1.49 
STG£/€ Exchange Rate (annual average) 0.69 0.79 0.89 0.90 
Main ECB Interest Rate (end of year) 4.00 2.50 1.00 1.75 
     
 
1 In the tables and text we present percentages (rates of change or percentage shares) of historical 
data to one decimal point. For our forecasts such percentages are presented as fractions rounded-off 
to the nearest quarter. This is to emphasise the distinction between historical data and forecast 
numbers.  
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SUMMARY 
It is hard to overstate what a difficult year 2009 has been for the Irish economy. We now 
expect that the economy will contract by 10 per cent on a GNP basis this year, or 7¼  per 
cent in GDP terms. This follows a contraction of around 3 per cent in 2008, in both GNP 
and GDP terms. While these are stark figures, the true impact of the recession is probably 
better illuminated through the figures on employment and unemployment. We now expect 
that the average number employed will be 170,000 lower in 2009 relative to 2008. 
Comparing 2007 and 2009, that figure is likely to be 193,000. At the end of 2007, the rate of 
unemployment was just 4.6 per cent; at the end of 2009, it is 12.5 per cent. 
 
We expect to see a further contraction in the economy in 2010 but this contraction will be 
modest compared with 2009. We expect GNP to fall by 1½ per cent in volume terms; for 
GDP, the corresponding decline is ¼ per cent. This annual figure is based on output 
continuing to fall at the start of the year followed by a resumption of growth in the second 
half.  
 
Given positive developments in the international environment, exports are expected to 
grow next year at a rate of 1½ per cent. However, domestic factors will act as a drag on 
growth. Private consumption is expected to fall by 1 per cent, investment by 17½  per cent  
and public consumption by 3 per cent. It should be noted that although consumption is 
expected to fall, our forecasts include a modest reduction in the savings rate between 2009 
and 2010, from 11½  per cent to 10¾ per cent. This fall is included in the expectation that 
Budget 2010 will have boosted confidence, as will a slower pace of employment loss in 
2010 relative to 2009. 
 
On employment, we expect a fall of 170,000 in 2009 and of 76,000 in 2010. Unemployment 
is forecast to average 11¾  per cent this year and to peak at close to 14 per cent in the latter 
part of 2010. We expect net outward migration to be 40,000 in the year ending April 2010.  
 
On the public finances, we expect the general government deficit to be 11¾  per cent of 
GDP in 2009 and 11½ in 2010. The general government debt is forecast to reach 78 per 
cent of GDP by the end of 2010. This figure does not include any net liabilities under 
NAMA as such liabilities will not be treated as part of the general government debt. 
 
We expect that CPI inflation will average -4½  per cent this year and -½  per cent in 2010. 
The corresponding forecasts for HICP inflation are -1¾  and -1. 
 
In our General Assessment, we discuss how Budget 2010 can be judged positively in terms of 
macro-fiscal management, even if some micro-dimensions are open to question. One such 
example is the exclusion of all pensions from cuts regardless of the wealth and incomes of 
those concerned. In spite of popular perceptions, analysis contained in the Commentary 
shows that Budget 2010 was not the most contractionary of modern times, largely due to 
the deflationary context in which the meaures were enacted. A further piece of analysis 
shows that while Budget 2010 was clearly regressive, the combination of Budgets 2009 and 
2010 placed most of the burden of fiscal adjustment on higher earners.  
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2008 (Estimate) 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008 
  Estimate €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 91,948 93,863 1,915 -893 2.1 3.1 -1.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27,275 28,901 1,626 716 6.0 3.3 2.6 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 49,429 39,474 -9,955 -7,663 -20.1 -5.5 -15.5 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 153,481 151,896 -1,585 -1,606 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 
Physical Changes in Stocks -146 317 464 447    
        
Final Demand 321,986 314,451 -7,535 -8,998 -2.3 0.5 -2.8 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 134,112 133,002 -1,110 -2,846 -0.8 1.3 -2.1 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -1,876 -365 1,511 -392    
        
GDP at Market Prices 189,751 181,815 -7,936 -5,760 -4.2 -1.2 -3.0 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -28,507 -27,218 1,289 1,276 -4.5 0.0 -4.5 
        
GNP at Market Prices 161,244 154,596 -6,648 -4,484 -4.1 -1.4 -2.8 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008 
  Estimate   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,249 2,890 -359 -11.0 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 77,328 78,929 1,601 2.1 
  Other: 70,587 63,088 -7,499 -10.6 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -648 -186   
 Statistical Discrepancy -1,876 -365   
     
Net Domestic Product 148,641 144,357 -4,283 -2.9 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -28,507 -27,218 1,289 -4.5 
     
National Income 120,133 117,139 -2,994 -2.5 
Depreciation 17,849 17,443 -405 -2.3 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 137,982 134,582 -3,400 -2.5 
Taxes less Subsidies 23,262 20,014 -3,248 -14.0 
     
GNP at Market Prices 161,244 154,596 -6,648 -4.1 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
    
    2007    2008 Change in 2008 
      Estimate  
          €m    €m              €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 19,369 18,894 -475 
Net Factor Payments (F) -28,507 -27,218 1,289 
Net Transfers -990 -1,115 -125 
    
Balance on Current Account -10,128 -9,439 689 
as % of GNP -6.3 -6.1 0.2 
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2006 2007 2007 Volume 
Change 
  Estimate   
 €m €m €m % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  -1,961   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 161,244 154,799 -6,445 -4.0 
GNDI* 160,254 153,699 -6,556 -4.1 
National Resources** 160,293 153,767 -6,527 -4.1 
 •GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2009 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
 Estimate Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 93,863 84,674 -9,189 -6,570 -9 ¾ -3 -7 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28,901 26,401 -2,500 -434 -8 ¾ -7 ¼ -1 ½ 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 39,474 25,525 -13,949 -11,970 -35 ¼ -7 ¼ -30 ¼ 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 151,896 150,143 -1,753 -4,050 -1 ¼ 1 ½ -2 ¾ 
Physical Changes in Stocks 317 -1,732 -2,049 -2,344    
        
Final Demand 314,451 285,011 -29,441 -25,852 -9 ¼ -1 ¼ -8 ¼ 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 133,002 121,933 -11,068 -12,650 -8 ¼ 1 ¼ -9 ½ 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -365 -365 0 -112    
        
GDP at Market Prices 181,815 163,442 -18,372 -13,090 -10 -3 ¼ -7 ¼ 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -27,218 -30,324 -3,105 -2,511 11 ½ 2 9 ¼ 
        
GNP at Market Prices 154,596 133,119 -21,478 -15,541 -14 -4 ¼ -10 
        
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
 Estimate Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2,890 2,168 -723 -25 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 78,929 72,118 -6,811 -8 ¾ 
  Other: 63,088 58,072 -5,017 -8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -186 -200   
 Statistical Discrepancy -365 -365   
     
Net Domestic Product 144,357 131,793 -12,565 -8 ¾ 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -27,218 -30,324 -3,105 11 ½ 
     
National Income 117,139 101,469 -15,670 -13 ½ 
Depreciation 17,443 15,981 -1,463 -8 ½ 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 134,582 117,449 -17,133 -12 ¾ 
Taxes less Subsidies 20,014 15,669 -4,345 -21 ¾ 
     
GNP at Market Prices 154,596 133,119 -21,478 -14 
    
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
 Estimate Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
    
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 18,894 28,210 9,315 
Net Factor Payments (F) -27,218 -30,324 -3,105 
Net Transfers -1,115 -1,163 -48 
    
Balance on Current Account -9,439 -3,277 6,162 
as % of GNP -6.1 -2 ½ 3 ¾ 
    
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2008 2009 2009 Volume 
Change 
  Estimate   
 €m €m €m % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  349   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 154,596 139,405 -15,192 -9 ¾ 
GNDI* 153,481 138,257 -15,225 -10 
National Resources** 153,549 138,557 -14,993 -9 ¾ 
•GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2010 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
       
Private Consumer Expenditure 84,674 83,408 -1,266 -847 -1 ½ - ½ -1 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26,401 23,275 -3,126 -792 -11 ¾ -9 -3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 25,525 19,890 -5,635 -4,442 -22 -5 ¾ -17 ½ 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 150,143 153,837 3,694 2,292 2 ½ 1 1 ½ 
Physical Changes in Stocks -1,732 -96 1,636 1,170    
        
Final Demand 285,011 280,314 -4,696 -3,159 -1 ¾ - ½ -1 
less: 0 0 0 0    
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 121,933 119,977 -1,957 -2,962 -1 ½ ¾ -2 ½ 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -365 -365 0 89    
        
GDP at Market Prices 163,442 160,703 -2,740 -286 -1 ¾ -1 ½ - ¼ 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -30,324 -31,911 -1,587 -1,748 5 ¼ - ½ 5 ¾ 
        
GNP at Market Prices 133,119 128,792 -4,327 -1,900 -3 ¼ -1 ¾ -1 ½ 
        
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2,168 2,168 0 0 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 72,118 67,693 -4,425 -6 ¼ 
  Other: 58,072 60,031 1,960 3 ¼ 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -200 -200   
 Statistical Discrepancy -365 -365   
     
Net Domestic Product 131,793 129,327 -2,465 -1 ¾ 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -30,324 -31,911 -1,587 5 ¼ 
     
National Income 101,469 97,416 -4,052 -4 
Depreciation 15,981 15,792 -188 -1 ¼ 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 117,449 113,209 -4,241 -3 ½ 
Taxes less Subsidies 15,669 15,583 -86 - ½ 
     
GNP at Market Prices 133,119 128,792 -4,327 -3 ¼ 
    
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
    
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 28,210 33,861 5,651 
Net Factor Payments (F) -30,324 -31,911 -1,587 
Net Transfers -1,163 -1,163 0 
    
Balance on Current Account -3,277 787 4,064 
as % of GNP -2 ½ ½ 3 
    
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2009 2010 2010 Volume 
Change 
  Estimate   
 €m €m €m % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  114   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 133,119 131,332 -1,786 -1 ¼ 
GNDI* 131,956 130,179 -1,776 -1 ¼ 
National Resources** 132,024 130,479 -1,544 -1 ¼ 
•GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers
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THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
The economic trauma which hit the world’s economies in the latter part 
of 2008 and early 2009 is reflected in the growth figures shown in Table 1. 
According to the OECD, the Euro Area will contract by 4 per cent in 
2009. The contraction in both Germany and Italy is expected to be close to 
5 per cent, with France faring somewhat better and contracting by a more 
modest 2.3 per cent. The UK is expected to experience a GDP fall of 4.7 
per cent in 2009 while the corresponding figure for the US is 2.5 per cent.  
 
While the global downturn has been severe, the data for the third 
quarter of 2009 provide a basis for cautious optimism. The Euro Area grew 
by 0.4 per cent in Q32, thereby signalling the end of recession for the 
region as a whole. As discussed in the last Commentary, France and Germany 
had already recorded a return to growth in Q2 and this was maintained in 
Q3. France grew by 0.3 per cent in Q3 while Germany grew by 0.7 per 
cent. Italy also recorded growth in Q3, of 0.6 per cent, but Spain remained 
in recession, with GDP falling by 0.3 per cent. 
 
The US had still been in recession in Q2 of this year but it too had 
returned to growth by Q3, with growth of 0.7 per cent. By contrast, the 
UK remained in recession in Q3, with GDP falling by 0.3 per cent. For 
Japan, the timing of recovery was similar to that of Germany, with growth 
being recorded in Q2 and then accelerating in Q3 when growth of 1.2 per 
cent was recorded. 
 
The severe contractions across the major economies are reflected in the 
other indicators in Table 1. Inflation across the globe in 2009 has been 
either low or negative. The UK is expected to have the highest rate, at just 
over 2 per cent. The figure for the UK is partly related to sterling weakness 
and we return to this issue below. For the Euro Area, inflation is expected 
to be 0.2 per cent in 2009; in the US, inflation is expected to be negative 
this year, at -0.4 per cent.  
 
The trends in unemployment across 2008 and 2009 are as expected, 
given economic developments, with the exception of Germany. Although 
German GDP is expected to fall by almost 5 per cent in 2009, the increase 
in the rate of unemployment in 2009 is modest, rising to just 7.6 per cent 
from 7.2 per cent in 2008. Part of this can be explained by the employment 
subsidy which the German government has provided in an effort to reduce 
 
2 All growth figures quoted in this paragraph are quarter on quarter and seasonally 
adjusted.  
Main 
Developments 
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redundancies. The number of workers on this scheme approached 1.5 
million in the summer.  
 
Trends in General Government Balances partly reflect the deterioration 
in economic conditions but also the stimulus packages that many 
governments have implemented. While all countries have seen significant 
deteriorations in their public finances, the US and the UK stand out with 
both likely to post deficits of well over 10 per cent of GDP in 2009. 
 
The existence of high levels of public deficits is among a number of 
factors that are leading international forecasters to remain cautious on the 
prospects for economic growth in 2010 and beyond. The build-up in public 
debt means that governments will have to begin the process of rolling back 
on stimulatory fiscal policies. While all major economies are expected to 
maintain the patterns of growth which are emerging in 2009, the pace of 
growth in 2010 is generally expected to be modest. For the Euro Area, 
GDP is forecast to grow by just 0.9 per cent in 2010, with both Germany 
and France expected to grow by 1.4 per cent. Real GDP growth in the UK 
is expected to be 1.2 per cent next year. The expectations for the US are 
stronger, as reflected in the growth forecast of 2.5 per cent. 
 
Other factors which are likely to act as a drag on growth in 2010 are the 
possible tightening in monetary policy and on-going caution on the part of 
consumers. As we have discussed in previous Commentaries, official interest 
rates are at historic lows in the major economies, having been reduced 
aggressively in the latter part of 2008 and the early part of 2009. In addition 
to low interest rates, many central banks have been injecting huge amounts 
of liquidity into the markets through purchases, for example, of covered 
bonds in the case of the European Central Bank (ECB). As discussed in 
Euroframe (2009),3 the assets of the ECB jumped by about 25 per cent in 
the last quarter of 2008, with a doubling of assets in the case of the US 
Federal Reserve. Were such policies to remain in place for too long, a 
danger arises of inflationary pressures building and of inflationary 
expectations becoming elevated. For this reason, interest rate increases and 
a withdrawal of liquidity-related measures will occur in the near future 
although the precise timing, and the speed of adjustment, remains 
uncertain.4 
 
 
EXPORTS 
In Figure 1, we show the trend in world merchandise trade from the 
beginning of 2008 through to September 2009. The collapse in world trade 
volumes between the latter part of 2008 and the early part of 2009 is very 
evident. We can also see the subsequent stabilisation in volumes and then 
the upturn in the most recent months. This recovery should be positive 
from an Irish perspective, especially when combined with the favourable 
outlook for GDP growth in 2010, relative to 2009, across the major 
economies.  
 
3 Euroframe (2009), Economic Assessment of the Euro Area, available at www.euroframe.org 
4 We discuss in the section below on monetary indicators how conditions in inter-bank 
lending markets have returned to normality following the near-chaos of early 2009. This 
return to normality is another factor leading central banks to unwind their liquidity-related 
policy interventions. 
Implications 
for Ireland 
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One of the surprising features of the Irish economy during much of 
2009 was the relative resilience of exports when compared to the dramatic 
falls being experienced elsewhere. While the third quarter of 2009 showed 
some slippage,5 the broad picture which emerged over the year was that of 
an export base which was somewhat insulated from the recession, due in 
large part to the concentration of pharmaceutical products within those 
exports. As exports did not plummet during the worst of the contraction, 
they are unlikely to show as dramatic a bounce back as might be expected 
in other countries. Nevertheless, the more favourable economic climate of 
2010 should be positive for Irish exports, and as long as the trend in 
competiveness is reversed.  
Figure 1: Index of World Trade, January 2008 ─ September 2009 
120
125
130
135
140
145
150
155
160
165
170
2008M01 2008M04 2008M07 2008M10 2009M01 2009M04 2009M07
20
00
=1
00
Source: World Trade Monitor, CPB (The Netherlands).
Collapse of Lehman Brothers
 
INTEREST RATES 
As noted above, interest rates were cut to historically low levels during the 
course of 2009 and there is now a collective sense that there is no further 
scope for interest rate reductions, with upwards movements now in 
prospect. However, the precise timing and speed of those movements 
remain an open question. Managing the conflicting goals of ensuring that 
the recovery is sustainable and yet avoiding the build-up of inflationary 
pressures will be the key task facing monetary authorities in many 
jurisdictions in 2010, including the ECB.  
 
Within the Euro Area, inflation is expected to remain subdued during 
the course of 2010 – the OECD forecasts a HICP of just 0.9 per cent in 
2010. Such low inflation will result in part from excess productive capacity 
in the wake of the downturn and also from subdued wage pressures as a 
result of unemployment. Given this low inflationary environment and on-
going concerns about the sustainability of the recovery, we see it as being 
unlikely that the ECB would raise interest rates during the first half of 
2010. However, thereafter we envisage rates rising to 1.75 per cent by the 
end of 2010, as shown in Figure 2, with further rises beyond that almost 
 
5 The volume of goods exports fell by 6 per cent between July and August 2009. 
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inevitable6. We have expressed a concern in previous Commentaries about 
the possibility of interest rate rises occurring when the recovery in the Euro 
Area generally has taken root but when recovery in Ireland is still fragile. 
This remains a big concern as any steep interest rises will impact upon 
consumer confidence and the cost of credit.7 
Figure 2: Interest Rates 
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FORECAST
 
EXCHANGE RATES 
As shown in Figure 3, the Euro is currently strong relative to Sterling and 
this is a major concern for Ireland’s competitiveness. Having been in a 
range of .75 to .80 for most of last year, the rate peaked at over .97 in the 
last week of 2008. Since then, the Euro has eased somewhat, trading below 
.90 for most of the summer months. However, in September the rate broke 
.90 again and is currently hovering around .90 with negative implications 
for UK-oriented exporters, many of whom are indigenous enterprises. 
 
Much of the weakness of sterling is related to the general state of the 
economy, the very loose nature of monetary policy and the large fiscal 
deficit. As discussed above, the UK was unlike most major economies in 
failing to emerge from recession in the third quarter. It is forecast to have 
the largest public deficit of the major economies in 2010. With a general 
election certain to happen in 2010, the markets may believe that little will 
happen by way of fiscal correction in the early part of 2010, a view that was 
essentially confirmed by the UK Pre-Budget Report.  
 
Given the on-going depressed state of the UK economy and the 
difficulties with its public finances, it is likely that sterling will remain weak 
well into 2010. For this reason, we base our forecasts on the assumption 
that the STG£/€ exchange rate will average .9 next year.
 
6 As with all ESRI Commentaries projected values for interest rates and exchange rates 
should be viewed more as technical assumptions as opposed to forecasts. 
7 The rapid rise in the real mortgage rate shown in Figure 2 is related to the falling rate of 
inflation throughout the year. 
 9 
 
Table 1: Short term International Outlook 
 
             
 
GDP Output Growth 
Consumer Price 
Inflation* 
Unemployment Rate 
 
General Government 
Balance 
       % % of GDP 
             
Country 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
             
UK 0.6 -4.7 1.2 3.6 2.1 1.7 5.7 8.0 9.3 -5.3 -12.6 -13.3 
Germany 1.0 -4.9 1.4 2.8 0.2 1.0 7.2 7.6 9.2 0.0 -3.2 -5.3 
France 0.3 -2.3 1.4 3.2 0.1 1.0 7.4 9.1 9.9 -3.4 -8.2 -8.6 
Italy -1.0 -4.8 1.1 3.5 0.7 0.9 6.8 7.6 8.5 -2.7 -5.5 -5.4 
             
Euro Area 0.5 -4.0 0.9 3.3 0.2 0.9 7.5 9.4 10.6 -2.0 -6.1 -6.7 
USA 0.4 -2.5 2.5 3.8 -0.4 1.7 5.8 9.2 9.9 -6.5 -11.2 -10.7 
Japan -0.7 -5.3 1.8 1.4 -1.2 -0.9 4.0 5.2 5.6 -2.7 -7.4 -8.2 
China 9.0 8.5 9.0 5.9 -0.1 0.6 9.8 7.8 8.6    
             
OECD 0.6 -3.5 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 8.2 9.0 -3.5 -8.2 -8.3 
             
Ireland -3.0 -7 ¼ - ¼ 3.3 -1 ¾ -1 6.3 11 ¾ 13 ¾ -7.2 -11 ¾ -11 ½ 
             
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 86 and own forecasts for Ireland 
 HICP for Euro Area countries and the UK. 
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Since February and March of this year, the Euro has generally been 
strengthening relative to the US dollar. At that time, the Euro was worth 
around US$1.26 but since then the Euro has broken through the US$1.50 
mark (October 23/26). With the Euro Area having emerged from recession 
before the US, this real-economy factor has contributed to the 
strengthening of the Euro. In addition, this sequencing of the ends of 
recessions has led to an expectation of interest rate rises happening in the 
Euro Area before the US. This too has contributed to Euro strengthening. 
Our forecasts are based on the expectation that the US$/Euro Rate will 
average 1.49 next year. 
Figure 3: Exchange Rates 
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THE DOMESTIC 
ECONOMY 
The forecasts contained in this QEC are more positive about 2010 than 
those in the previous Commentary. This broadly reflects the more favourable 
international economic backdrop discussed in the International section. We 
expect GDP to contract by 7 ¼  per cent in 2009, with GNP contracting 
by 10 per cent. For 2010, we expect the pace of contraction to ease 
considerably with GDP expected to fall by ¼ per cent and GNP expected 
to fall by 1½ per cent.  
 
The most recent Quarterly National Accounts suggest that the economy has 
stabilised, with quarter-on-quarter GDP up 0.4 per cent (seasonally 
adjusted). However, this is driven by a very large fall in imports (4.5 per 
cent quarter-on-quarter) rather than a nascent recovery in other categories 
of expenditure. In particular, exports faltered in the third quarter having 
recorded positive growth in Q2. Furthermore, the very large fall in factor 
income flows in the recent quarter has widened the wedge between GDP 
and GNP, the latter recorded a quarter-on-quarter fall of 1.4 per cent. 
Table 2 shows what growth would be across the main expenditure headings 
given the trends up to Q3 2009 and on the assumption of no change for 
the remainder of the calendar year 2009, i.e., the implied carryover. 
Looking firstly at private consumption, the implied carryover is -7.3 per 
cent for 2009. Our forecast for 2009 is very similar, at -7 per cent. This 
means that we expect a modest increase in private consumption spending 
in the final quarter of 2009. However, we do expect a further fall in 
consumption in 2010, in response to the contractionary budget. For  
 
Table 2: Implied Carryover (% change) 
     
 2008 Carryover 
2009 
QEC Forecast 
2009 
QEC Forecast 
2010 
     
Private Consumer 
Expenditure 
-0.9 -7.3 -7 
-1 
Public Net Current 
Expenditure 
2.6 -1.0 -1½ 
-3 
Private Investment -15.6 -29.6 -30¼ -17.½ 
Exports -1.0 -2.4 -2.¾ 1.½ 
Imports -2.0 -9.3 -9½ -2½ 
Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
-3.0 -68 -7¼ 
-¼ 
Gross National Product 
(GNP) 
-2.8 -11.2 -10 
-1½ 
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both public consumption and investment, our forecasts incorporate 
expected on-going falls in volumes through the remainder of 2009 and into 
2010. In contrast, we expect exports to pick up during 2010, based on the 
improved prospects for the world economy. Imports are expected to 
decline in the remainder of 2009 before rising slightly in the second half of 
2010. 
 
While our forecasts for GNP and GDP are broadly in line with our 
most recent Commentaries, we are less pessimistic with regard to 
employment. We now expect the rate of unemployment to peak at almost 
14 per cent in 2010. This is a significant downward revision from our initial 
estimate in Spring 2009 of an unemployment rate of 16¾ per cent. This 
revision is partly driven by the stabilisation since then of the public 
finances, with an emphasis on pay and price cuts in budgetary measures 
adopted since then rather than employment cuts. But it is also due to the 
much more rapid fall in labour force participation throughout 2009 than we 
had anticipated.  
 
Our forecasts are based on the assumption that Budget 2010 is 
implemented in full. We expect the General Government Deficit in 2010 to 
remain essentially unchanged in, at 11½ per cent.  
 
 The volume of consumer expenditure has declined substantially since the 
beginning of last year, reflecting the difficult labour market conditions and 
an increase in precautionary saving by consumers. The most recent 
Quarterly National Accounts indicate that in the year ending September 2009 
the volume of private consumption fell by almost 7 per cent. This sharp 
decline is evident in the annualised figures across all the major indicators of 
consumption, as shown in Table 3. Based on data up to the end of 
September, retail sales have fallen by 17 per cent, with sales of vehicles 
particularly affected. In addition, the November Exchequer Returns show 
that revenue from consumption taxes8 was down by over 20 per cent in the 
January-November 2009 period, compared to the same period in 2008. The 
sharp decline since early 2008 has brought consumption back to a level last 
seen at the beginning of 2006, as shown in Figure 4. 
Table 3: Recent Indicators of Consumption (Annualised Growth Rates) 
     
 Retail Sales (Unadjusted) Trips New Vehicle All Vehicle 
 All 
Businesses 
Excluding 
Motor Trade 
Abroad Sales Sales 
2008Q1 5.8 7.0 11.6 -1.5 -2.6 
2008Q2 2.4 5.5 8.3 -10.3 -13.7 
2008Q3 -0.6 3.3 6.2 -12.8 -18.0 
2008Q4 -4.4 -0.7 2.1 -15.4 -20.9 
2009Q1 -11.1 -4.5 -3.1 -31.9 -44.7 
2009Q2 -14.5 -7.6 -5.0 -37.3 -62.2 
2009Q3 -17.0 -9.9  -46.1 -59.7 
      
 
 
 
 
8 Customs, Excise and VAT receipts. 
Consumption 
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Figure 4: Personal Expenditure on Consumer Goods and Services, 
Constant Prices (Seasonally Adjusted) 
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Source : Quarterly National Accounts , CSO.  
 
The quarter-on-quarter figures point to some signs of recent 
stabilisation. Seasonally adjusted consumption grew by 0.9 per cent in Q2, 
relative to Q1 as shown in Figure 4 above. It fell again in Q3, but by just 
0.7 per cent – a considerably slower pace of contraction compared to the 
first quarter of the year. Retail sales have also picked up, following a very 
sharp decline in the early part of this year. The index for all retail businesses 
registered quarter-on-quarter growth of 3.5 per cent in Q3, on a seasonally 
adjusted basis. The latest information from the KBC Ireland/ESRI 
Consumer Sentiment Index suggests that consumer confidence, while still 
fragile, is improving. In October the index reached its highest level since 
early 2008, and while it dropped slightly in November, it remains 
significantly higher than the all-time low of July 2008. 
 
Turning to our forecasts, we do not expect any further deterioration in 
consumption for the remainder of 2009, based on the indications of recent 
stabilisation. Given the very sharp decline in the earlier part of the year, this 
implies an annual fall of 7 per cent in 2009. For 2010, we have revised our 
forecast upward since our Autumn Commentary. At that time we expected an 
annual decline of 2 per cent in 2010 – we are now forecasting a smaller 
contraction of 1 per cent. We expect consumption to fall again in the early 
part of the year, in response to the full implementation of Budget 2010.9 
However, our upward revision to the annual forecast for 2010 is partly due 
to the composition of the Budget. The fiscal adjustment is based almost 
entirely on public expenditure, with only small changes made to taxation.10 
In addition, while the cuts to public sector pay and social welfare will affect 
personal disposable income levels, and hence consumption, the Budget 
 
9 Bergin, A., T. Conefrey, J. Fitz Gerald and I. Kearney, 2009. “The Behaviour of the Irish 
Economy: Insights from the HERMES Macroeconomic Model,” ESRI Working Paper 
No. 287. This paper demonstrates the impact of various changes to fiscal policy on the key 
macroeconomic aggregates. 
10 In our previous Commentary, we implemented a budgetary package for 2010 according to 
the details provided in the April Supplementary Budget. These included tax increases of 
€1.75 billion. The changes to taxation announced in Budget 2010 are expected to yield just 
€126 million in a full year. For full details see www.budget.gov.ie  
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does not imply significant employment losses in the public sector. As 
discussed in the Employment section below, we have revised our forecast for 
the unemployment rate in 2010 downward and this will have a positive 
impact on consumer spending. Furthermore, we expect that the 
implementation of the pre-announced €4 billion savings package will give 
some boost to consumer confidence. As discussed in previous Commentaries, 
our forecasts for 2009 include an increase in the savings rate, reflecting the 
response of consumers to on-going uncertainties in relation to issues such 
as employment and taxation. We assume that the Budget removes an 
element of that uncertainty for consumers and, as a result, we expect to see 
some reduction in the savings rate in 2010. We will return to this point in 
the section on Incomes. 
Figure 5: Quarter-on-Quarter Consumption Growth, Constant Prices 
(Seasonally Adjusted) 
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 In the last Commentary, we noted how the changing pattern of investment 
between Q1 and Q2 of 2009 was something of a puzzle. According to the 
Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) for Q2 2009 investment had fallen by 
over 10 per cent in Q1 (on a quarter-on-quarter basis, seasonally adjusted) 
but had then risen by over 5 per cent in Q2. The latest Quarterly National 
Accounts show that investment fell by 9.9 per cent in Q3, as reflected in 
Figure 6. They also show a revision to the Q1 and Q2 figures, which are 
now estimated to be -12.6 per cent and +0.5 per cent respectively. 
 
Investment 
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Table 4: Gross Fixed Capital Formation   
        
 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 
           
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Housing 21,542 -26.3 -29.8 15,123 -40 -44 ½ 8,391 -29 ¾ -37 ¼ 5,272 
           
Other Building 13,351 8.6 -1.2 13,193 -20 -28 9,499 -15 -21 7,509 
           
Transfer Costs 3,373 -42.6 -50.2 1,681 -60 -70 504 -15 -20 403 
           
Building and   
Construction 38,266 -15.5 -21.6 29,997 -32 ¼ -38 ¾ 18,394 -21 ½ -28 ¼ 13,184 
           
Machinery and 
Equipment 11,163 -15.4 -15.1 9,477 -24 -24 ¾ 7,130 -5 -6 6,706 
           
Total 49,429 -15.5 -20.1 39,474 -30 ¼ -35 ¼ 25,525 -17 ½ -22 19,890 
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Figure 6: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth in Investment, Constant Prices, 
Seasonally Adjusted 
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In Figure 7, we show the latest trends in house building. The overall 
picture is now familiar with house completions continuing to decline, along 
with the other indicators of activity in the sector. In the year ending Q3 
2009, almost 32,000 housing units were completed, a reduction of close on 
50 per cent relative to the year ended Q3 2008. We now expect to see 
24,000 house completions for the calendar year 2009. Looking into 2010, 
we expect the downward trend in completions to continue based on the 
leading indicators shown in Figure 7. Our forecast is for 10,000 
completions in 2010. These completion figures imply falls in housing 
output of 40 per cent in 2009 and of 29¾  per cent in 2010. With house 
prices continuing to fall, the reductions in value terms are steeper. 
Figure 7: Housing Statistics, Annualised Numbers 
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According to the ESRI/PTSB house price index, house prices continue 
to fall and at a pace similar to earlier months. The October index showed a 
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national fall of 1.8 per cent in the month, which compares to falls of 1.1 
per cent, 1.5 per cent and 1.1 per cent in September, August and July 
respectively. House prices in October were 12.7 per cent lower than at the 
start of the year and are now 26.6 per cent below their peak values of 
February 2007.11 As in our previous Commentary, we expect price falls to 
continue through 2010 and for the cumulative fall in the price of new 
houses relative to the peak in 2007 to amount to 40 per cent. 
 
In addition to the on-going falls in housing, building and construction 
activity is also declining, and will continue to decline, because of falls in 
commercial and retail building and in public investment. As discussed in 
the section on the public finances, a proportion of the adjustment in 
spending both in 2009 and in 2010 is being borne by the public capital 
programme. However, with tender prices falling, the impact on the volume 
of output will be lower than the impact on values. For 2009, we now 
expect “other building” to contract by 20 per cent in volume terms and by 
28 per cent in value terms. The corresponding figures for 2010 are -15 per 
cent (volume) and -21 per cent (value). 
 
Given the broad economic conditions in 2009, it is no surprise that 
investment in machinery and equipment has fallen. Year-on-year to Q3 
2009, it is estimated by the CSO that this component of investment fell by 
25 per cent. For the year 2009, we now expect that the decline will be 24 
per cent. With conditions remaining subdued in 2010, it is likely that 
investment will also remain subdued and so we are forecasting a 
contraction of 5 per cent in the volume of investment in machinery and 
equipment next year. 
 
In total, we expect that investment will fall by 30¼ per cent in 2009 and by 
a further 17½  per cent in 2010.  
 
 Budget 2010 has introduced a series of expenditure cuts equivalent to €4 
billion, or 2.4 per cent of GDP. This follows a series of measures begun in 
the middle of 2008 which are cumulatively equivalent to over €9 billion or 
5.5 per cent of GDP. While the measures introduced in the course of 2009 
included large increases in taxation with limited reductions in expenditure, 
Budget 2010 is concentrated on cuts in expenditure, in particular current 
expenditure cuts of €3 billion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 It should be noted that the ESRI/PTSB house price index lags the market by a number 
of months due to the method of data collection. 
Government 
Spending 
and Public 
Finances 
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Table 5: Public Finances  
        
 2007 
€m 
% 
Change 
2008 
€m 
% 
Change 
2009 
€m 
% 
Change 
2010 
€m 
        
Current Revenue 47,887 -13.1 41,624 -19 ¾ 33,404 3 ¼ 34,024 
Current Expenditure 40,896 9.3 44,692 1 ¾ 45,520 3 ½ 47,123 
   of which: Voted 36,959 10.3 40,757 -1 40,368 - ½ 40,191 
        
Current Surplus 6,991  -3,068  -12,116  -13,099 
        
Capital Receipts 1,408 -0.8 1,398 4 ¾ 1,464 14 ¼ 1,672 
Capital Expenditure 10,019 10.2 11,043 32 ¼ 14,609 -54 6,734 
   of which: Voted 7,650 11.8 8,556 -20 ¾ 6,773 -12 ¾ 5,909 
        
Capital Borrowing -8,610  -9,645  -13,145  -5,062 
        
Exchequer Balance -1,619.2  -12,713.5  -25,261.0  -18,161 
 as % of GNP -1.0  -8.2  -19  -14 
        
General Government 
Balance* 345.8  -13,037.0  -19,260.0  -18,560.3 
 as % of GDP 0.2  -7.2  -11 ¾  -11 ½ 
        
Gross Debt as % of GDP 25.1  44.2  65 ¼  78 
        
Net Debt as % of GDP** 12.2  22.6  41  53 ¼ 
        
* 2008 - 2010 numbers are based on National Accounts estimates. 
**Net of NPRF, Social Insurance and Exchequer Balances. 
 
Figure 8: November Exchequer Returns 
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The end-November exchequer returns showed total tax revenue in the 
first eleven months of 2009 was just under €31 billion, down almost €14 
billion from the same period in 2007. Taxes have fallen across all categories 
(see Figure 8), with the largest falls in property related taxes (stamp duty, 
capital gains tax, capital acquisitions tax and VAT) but also significant falls 
in income tax receipts, the latter despite increases in income levies in the 
last two budgets. While to some extent the decline in income tax receipts 
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simply reflects the decline in employment and pay rates in the economy, 
the performance of this category is below our forecasts. This is arguably 
due to a decline in annual earnings in the economy, as reflected in recent 
declines in average hours worked. The scale of the collapse in tax revenues 
is shown in Table 6. This compares revenues in 2007 with 2009 across the 
broad categories. Total exchequer tax revenue is down by €15 billion or 
almost one-third in two years. 
Table 6: Tax Revenues 
     
 2007 2008 200912 Change since 2007 
 €m €m €m €m % 
Excise 5,838 5,443 4,575 -1,263 -22 
Stamps 3,186 1,651 900 -2,286 -72 
Capital Gains Tax 3,105 1,430 385 -2,720 -88 
Capital Acquisitions Tax 392 332 260 -132 -34 
Corporation Tax 6,391 5,066 3,790 -2,601 -41 
VAT 14,497 13,430 10,640 -3,857 -27 
Income Tax (including levy) 13,572 13,177 11,810 -1,762 -13 
Total Tax Revenue 47,249 40,777 32,570 -14,679 -31 
      
 
The latest official estimates suggest that the General Government 
Balance will be just above €19 billion in 2009, equivalent to 11 ¾ per cent 
of GDP. In this Commentary we have implemented the €4 billion 
expenditure cuts announced in the Budget, €3 billion on current 
expenditure and €1 billion on capital expenditure. Using the official 
forecasts for expenditure and non-tax revenues from Budget 2010, and our 
own tax forecasts, we forecast that this will remain broadly unchanged in 
2010, at €18.6 billion. On this basis, and excluding the funding costs 
associated with NAMA in 2010, this will imply that the gross debt as a 
percentage of GDP will be 78 per cent at the end of 2010, up from 25 per 
cent in 2006. However, a significant part of this debt is held in 
Government funds by the NTMA, both in the National Pension Reserve 
Fund and in exchequer cash balances. This means that the net debt in 2010 
will be significantly lower, at 53¼ per cent of GDP.13 Relative to 2007, this 
is an increase of almost €63 billion in net indebtedness, 40 percentage 
points of GDP, and reflects the speed with which the public finances have 
unravelled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Dept. of Finance full-year estimates in Budget 2010 book. 
13 These figures do not include the planned government borrowings for NAMA of €54 
billion. 
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Figure 9: Irish Government Bond Yields and German Equivalents 
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With the recent turbulence on markets in relation to Greece’s funding 
position, it is important to keep track of the current and future costs of 
funding Irish government debt. The deterioration in the government’s 
fiscal position, the increase in its contingent liabilities arising from the 
introduction of the bank guarantee scheme, and the subsequent supports 
for the banking system (Table 7) led to a significant widening in Irish 
government bond yields over their German equivalents from late 2008, as 
shown in Figure 9. The differential on 10 year government bonds widened 
from 30 basis points in August 2008 to 230 in February 2009 due to the 
increased perceived risk of Irish bonds as well as increased risk aversion on 
the part of investors. The Irish bond spread vis-à-vis Germany tightened 
significantly between April and October 2009 in the wake of government 
actions aimed at stabilising the deficit and amid signs that the pace of 
economic contraction was easing. Nonetheless, Irish yield spreads remain 
among the highest in the Euro Area reflecting ongoing concern regarding 
the sustainability of the public finances.  
Table 7: Overview of Existing and Announced Government Support to the 
Banks 
  
 € billion 
2009 - Total Recapitalisation end November 2009:  
Allied Irish Bank 3.5 
Anglo Irish Bank 4.0 
Bank of Ireland 3.5 
2010 - Payment Planned for Loans under NAMA        54.0   
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Box 1: Measuring Fiscal Stance 
 
Measures of fiscal stance attempt to capture in a single indicator the 
combined macroeconomic effects of all the various decisions taken in a 
budget in respect of public expenditure and taxation. The macroeconomic 
impact of a government’s budget is typically judged on whether the fiscal 
stance is considered to be expansionary or contractionary in terms of either 
boosting or dampening aggregate demand in the domestic economy. There 
is, however, no universally accepted indicator or methodology for assessing 
fiscal stance.  
 
The current methodology used by the European Commission in 
assessing the stance of fiscal policy involves estimating the structural 
budget balance in each year based on an estimate of the potential output of 
the economy in each year. However, there are a number of difficulties in 
interpreting the structural budget balance as an indicator of fiscal stance. 
There are methodological difficulties surrounding the definition and 
measurement of capacity output. Blanchard (1990)14 has argued that the 
choice of a benchmark for the economy is “needlessly controversial” in 
measuring fiscal stance. The definition of capacity output involves making 
implicit assumptions about the future course of the economy that are 
unnecessary if we are interested is assessing fiscal stance. Such difficulties 
can be avoided by basing the measure of fiscal stance on the change in 
discretionary policy relative to the previous year’s budget. In this box we 
present such an indexed budget measure using the ESRI HERMES 
macroeconomic model. 
 
Figure A shows our estimates of the overall measure of fiscal stance 
based on the difference between an indexed and actual General 
Government Deficit15. A positive result implies an expansionary Budget, a 
negative sign indicates a contractionary Budget. Scanning across the graph 
we can see that the most contractionary Budget since 1976 was introduced 
in that year. But this measure also suggests that the Budgets of 1983, 1988 
and 1989 were all more contractionary than either the 2009 or proposed 
2010 Budget. This seems to contradict popular perceptions that these two 
recent budgets are the most contractionary in the history of the state. The 
reason for this is relatively straightforward: while the nominal cuts 
introduced in the 2009 and 2010 Budgets may well be unprecendented, in 
real terms their effect is much more muted since prices and wages are also 
falling in the economy. By contrast in the 1980s, relatively high rates of 
inflation meant that a nominal freeze in pay rates or welfare payments 
translated into a more severe real reduction. 
 
 
 
14 Blanchard, O.J., 1990. “Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators”, OECD Working 
Paper, No.79. 
15 For further details see Kearney et al. (2001), “Assessing the Stance of Irish Fiscal 
Policy”, in Budget Perspectives Proceedings of a Conference Held on 19 September 2000.  Dublin: 
Economic and Social Research Institute, September. 
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Figure A: Incremental Measure of Fiscal Stance (% of GNP) 
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Figure B breaks down the composition of this fiscal stance measure 
among the main categories of expenditure. Scanning across the graph it is 
clear that capital expenditure has been the most discretionary element of 
short-term budgetary policy. In particular it explains the very severe 
contraction implied by the 1976 budget, when capital expenditure cuts of 
over 4 percentage points of GDP were implemented. In relation to the 
2010 Budget, the breakdown seems counter-intuitive; it suggests that 
discretionary changes in current expenditure have had an expansionary 
effect on the overall fiscal stance. This reflects the difficulty of 
implementing an indexed Budget at a time of deflation, in particular in 
relation to pension payments. With nominal pension payments unchanged, 
forecasts of falls in prices and wage levels in 2010 mean that this measure 
forms a real stimulus to the economy. 
Figure B: Composition of Fiscal Stance 
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Figure C gives an overview of the cumulative effect of these budgetary 
changes across distinct time periods. The periods chosen are based on four 
phases of distinct shifts in Irish fiscal policy identified by Honohan (1999) 
as  
 1977-1981   Unsustainable Expansion 
 1982-1986   Good Intentions 
 1987-1989   Decisive Action 
 1990- present  A New Equilibrium 
 
We have split the post 1989 period into a further four sub-periods,  
 
 1990-98   “New Equilibrium” 
 1999-2002  Growth 
 2003-2004  Dotcom slowdown 
 2005-2008  Bubble 
 2009-2010  Retrenchment 
 
Figure C shows that between 1999 and 2002 there was a cumulative 
giveaway equivalent to far more than the “spendthrift years” of the late 
1970s. It also suggests that the current period of retrenchment is less severe 
in impact than in the period 1987-1989.16 The graph also includes the 
annual average growth in GDP. This clearly suggests that, with the 
exception of the 1987-1989 and 2003-2004 periods, fiscal policy has for the 
past thirty years been decidedly pro-cyclical.  
Figure C: Measure of Fiscal Stance and GDP Growth Rate, Annual 
Averages 
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16 However, this is not a fully valid comparison since 2011 is also expected to include a 
contractionary budget which is not included here. 
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Box 2: Distributional Impact of Tax and Welfare Policy Changes 
by T. Callan, C. Keane and J.R. Walsh 
 
We have argued consistently that the distributional impact of tax and 
welfare changes must be assessed against a benchmark which is 
“distributionally neutral”.17 The conventional opening budget measures 
changes against a scenario in which tax and welfare parameters are frozen 
in nominal terms. This is not a neutral benchmark: in periods of growth it 
would mean that welfare recipients would not share in growth, while in 
current circumstances, with wages (and prices) falling, the relative incomes 
of welfare recipients would increase if welfare rates remained the same 
while other incomes fell. A budget indexed to changes in wages has been 
shown to approximate a neutral benchmark, against which policy changes 
can be measured, and we continue to use this consistent framework in 
assessing the impact of policy changes. We look first at the impact of 
Budget 2010, and then at the cumulative impact of the Budgets for 2009 
and Budget 2010. The analysis includes the impact of the public service 
pension levy, but does not, at this stage, include the recently announced 
public sector pay cuts.18 Each of these would involve further substantial 
variation in impacts within income groups. Here we concentrate on average 
effects across income groups.  
Figure A: Distributional Impact of Budget 2010 versus Wage Indexation  
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Note: Family units or households are divided into 5 equal sized groups, ranked by from 
lowest to highest incomes (adjusted for family/household size and composition) 
 
Figure 1 shows the distributional impact of Budget 2010, measured 
against a benchmark which indexes of tax and welfare parameters with 
respect to the 2.5 per cent fall in wages forecast in this Commentary. Analysis 
at family unit level (which groups children of school age or below  along 
with third level students living in the parental home) finds that there is a 
decline of over 4 per cent for the lowest income quintile.  Much of this 
effect is driven by the very sharp reductions in Job Seeker’s Allowance for 
 
17 T. Callan, M. Keeney and J.R. Walsh “Income Tax and Welfare Policies: Some Current 
Issues” in T. Callan and D. McCoy (eds.) Budget Perspectives 2002.  
18 Analysis of the distributional impact of public sector pay cuts is now under way. 
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those aged under 25. The full rate of payment is €196, but this is reduced 
by close to 25 per cent for those aged between 22 and 24, and by almost 
half for those aged 20 or 2119  Many of the young people on Job Seeker’s 
Allowance are living in the parental home, and their entitlements were 
already subject to a reduction depending on familial means. Young adults, 
whether at work  or claiming welfare, count as separate family units within 
the larger household. 
 
Official targets for reductions in the numbers in poverty20 are typically 
measured at household level.21 For this reason it is of interest to examine 
the distributive impact of  Budget 2010 measured at household level. Here 
the impact on the lowest income group, relative to a wage-indexed budget, 
is much less severe: a fall of 1.5 per cent. For other income quintiles there 
are very small gains, with the gain at the top reaching 0.5 per cent. This 
reflects the fact that tax credits, for example, were frozen rather than being 
reduced in line with wages and that welfare rates for the elderly remained 
unchanged.  
Figure B: Combined Distributional Impact of Budgets 2009 and Budget 
2010 versus Wage Indexation (-3.5%) 
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Note: Family units or households are divided into 5 equal sized groups, ranked by from 
lowest to highest incomes (adjusted for family/household size and composition) 
 
Figure 2 shows the results of a similar analysis for the consolidated 
Budget for 2009 and the recent Budget 2010. Taken together, these 
budgets can be seen as representing the consolidated policy response to the 
recession. Budget 2009 included a 3 per cent rise in the main welfare 
payment rates, and substantial increases in taxes and levies, including the 
public service pension levy. Once again, the impact on those at lowest 
incomes differs depending on the unit of analysis. The poorest family units 
see a  drop in income of about 3 per cent, but the average income of the 
poorest households hardly changes. On either measure there are gains (of 2 
or 3 per cent) for the next quintile, which contains many of those with 
 
19 The payment rate for those aged 18 or 19 had already been reduced by about half in 
April’s Supplementary Budget for 2009. 
20 This applies equally to both the Irish government’s measure of “consistent poverty” and 
the EU’s headline indicator of numbers “at risk of poverty”. 
21 Most academic research on poverty is also conducted at this level. 
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State pensions, which remained unchanged. There have been substantial 
falls for the top end of the income distribution (about 6 per cent for both 
households or family units) and for the quintile with the second highest 
incomes (losses of about 3 per cent). These losses arise mainly from the 
income taxes and levies (including the public service pension levy) imposed 
in April 2009’s Supplementary Budget. 
 
Thus, while Budget 2010 is clearly regressive, with, the combination of 
Budgets 2009 and 2010 put the greatest burden of adjustment on those 
with highest incomes. The position of those with the lowest incomes 
depends to a significant extent on whether this is measured at household 
level, or at the narrower family unit level. On average there is a 3 per cent 
reduction in the incomes of the poorest 20 per cent of family units, which 
includes many young unemployed people affected by the sharpest 
reductions in welfare payments. However, the average effect on the poorest 
20 per cent of households is slight. 
 
 In spite of the collapse in world trade, Irish exports have been remarkably 
resilient by international standards. The volume of exports fell by 2.7 per 
cent in the first nine months of 2009, compared to the same period last 
year. However, the latest Quarterly National Accounts show a fall in the third 
quarter, with export volumes down  by 0.6 per cent in Q3 relative to Q2 
(seasonally adjusted). This mirrors the recent weakness in volume export 
growth evident from the trade statistics. 
 
The most recent merchandise trade data show that the merchandise 
trade surplus continues to rise. This increase is mainly driven by a very 
dramatic fall in imports, discussed below (Figure 10). Merchandise exports 
have proved relatively resilient throughout 2009. In the first seven months 
of 2009 total merchandise exports were broadly unchanged relative to the 
same period in 2008. However, this aggregate performance masks a 
significant shift in the composition of total exports. Exports of chemicals 
and related products increased by 12 per cent, driven by strong growth in 
pharmaceutical products and organic chemicals. Across the other broad 
categories, there were significant declines in the exports of electrical 
machinery and computer equipment; the latter is likely in part to reflect the 
relocation of Dell to Poland. Furthermore, there has been a fall in exports 
to the UK of over 16 per cent over the same period, this is most likely 
driven by the recent weakness in Sterling together with the weak 
performance of the UK economy.   
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Table 8: Exports of Goods and Services   
        
 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 % Change in 2009    2009 % Change in 2010     2010 
           
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value    €m Volume Value     €m 
           
Merchandise 84,079 -0.8 -3.1 81,495 -4 ¾ -2 79,865 2 3 82,261 
Tourism 4,426 -5.8 -3.3 4,279 -16 ¼ -18 3,509 - ½ -1 3,474 
Other Services 63,534 -1.0 2.2 64,924 1 1 65,573 1 2 66,885 
           
Exports of Goods  
  and Services 152,039 -1.0 -0.9 150,698 -2 ¾ -1 ¼ 148,947 1 ½ 2 ½ 152,619 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1,442   1,198   1,196   1,218 
           
Adjusted Exports 153,481 -1.0 -1.0 151,896 -2 ¾ -1 ¼ 150,143 1 ½ 2 ½ 153,837 
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Figure 10: Monthly Merchandise Trade, Seasonally Adjusted 
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
5,500
6,000
6,500
7,000
7,500
8,000
2007M01 2007M07 2008M01 2008M07 2009M01 2009M07
€ 
m
ill
io
ns
Imports Exports
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In terms of volume exports the performance is less favourable, with the 
index of merchandise exports in August down 12 per cent on the same 
month in 2008, and down 4.5 per cent in the year ended August 2009. The 
corollary of this is that prices of merchandise exports have edged upwards 
since the middle of 2008, although there are signs that prices have stabilised 
in recent months. This relatively large fall in volumes has led us revise 
downward our estimate of volume growth in merchandise trade in 2009 to 
-4¾ per cent. 
 
The latest statistics from the Centraal Planbureau (CPB) in The 
Netherlands indicate that world merchandise trade has begun to recover, 
and indeed has risen strongly in recent months (see Figure 1 in section on 
international developments above). Its most recent forecasts suggest that in 
2010 the volume of world trade could grow by over 7 per cent. Our own 
forecasts for Irish merchandise export volumes is an increase of 2 per cent 
in 2010. This can be regarded as a relatively sluggish performance in view 
of the prospects for world trade next year together with our forecast of a 
continued weakness in Sterling in 2010. In value terms, our projections are 
higher, in light of recent price developments. Following a fall of 2.3 per 
cent in merchandise export prices in 2008, we expect prices to increase by 3 
per cent this year and by a further 1 per cent in 2010. These figures imply 
that the value of Irish merchandise exports will fall by 2 per cent in 2009 
and increase by 3 per cent in 2010.  
 
The performance of services exports in the first half of the year has 
been mixed. The latest Q3 data from the Balance of Payments show 
substantial year-on-year increases in receipts from royalties/licences, 
business services and other services. However, exports of financial services, 
insurance and in particular tourism continue to decline. In value terms, 
total exports of services declined by 0.7 per cent in the year ended 
September 2009. 
 
Turning to our forecasts, we estimate that the volume of exports will fall 
by 2¾ per cent this year. We are predicting a return to growth in 2010, with 
an estimated increase of 1½ per cent in total export volumes. With regard 
to services exports, we are forecasting a very sharp decline in tourism 
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exports this year. Following a volume fall of almost 6 per cent in 2008, we 
expect an additional fall of 16¼ per cent this year. Based on the latest 
Balance of Payments data, we estimate that there will be a modest 1 per cent 
increase in the volume of non-tourism services exports in 2009. We expect 
these to stabilise in 2010, with a 1 per cent increase in the volume of non-
tourism services exports and a further ½ per cent decline in tourism 
exports.  
 
 Merchandise imports have fallen steeply since the middle of 2008, as 
shown above in Figure 10. In the year ended September 2009, total 
merchandise imports fell by over 22 per cent. Imports have declined across 
all uses, capital goods (21 per cent), consumption goods (13 per cent) and 
intermediate production (24 per cent), reflecting the very sharp decline in 
levels of investment and consumption. 
 
By contrast, services imports grew by 3.6 per cent in the year ended 
September 2009. This was largely due to growth in imports of business 
services and royalties. During this period tourism imports fell by 7 per cent, 
while imports of financial services declined by 13.8 per cent, and transport 
imports by 16.2 per cent. 
 
On the basis of these trends and our forecasts for very sharp declines in 
both private consumption and investment in 2009, we expect the volume 
of merchandise imports to fall by 23 per cent this year. Our projections for 
2010 imply a much improved performance, with an overall fall of 6½ per 
cent masking an upturn towards the latter half of 2010. With regard to 
services imports, we are forecasting a decline in the volume of tourism 
imports of 9½ per cent this year and 2½ per cent next year. We expect 
non-tourism services imports to increase by 2 per cent in volume this year, 
and by ¼ per cent next year. 
 
 Our forecasts for merchandise exports and imports imply an expansion 
of the merchandise trade surplus in 2009 and 2010 driven by the sharp fall 
in imports and the relatively stable performance of merchandise exports. 
The merchandise surplus is expected to increase by €10.7 billion in 2009 
and a further €5.6 billion in 2010. The services trade deficit narrowed 
significantly in 2007 as a result of strong growth in services exports. The 
decline in services exports in 2008 has given rise to a reversal of this trend 
and to a deterioration in the services trade balance. In 2009, we expect the 
services trade deficit to widen by €1.4 billion. Our forecasts for services 
exports imply a slight reduction in this deficit in 2010. On the basis of our 
projections, in particular the expected increase in the merchandise trade 
surplus, we expect a significant expansion in the overall trade balance to 
20¾ per cent of GNP in 2009 and 26 per cent of GNP in 2010. 
 
Regarding net factor flows, the latest Balance of Payments data indicate a 
sharp fall in both investment income inflows and outflows. Inflows fell 
particularly sharply driving a significant increase in net factor income flows. 
In the year ending September 2009, direct investment income fell by 31 per 
cent while there was a 34 per cent fall in portfolio investment income. We 
expect the net factor income deficit to increase by 11¾ per cent in 2009 
and by a further 5¼ per cent in 2010. While the widening of the  
Imports 
Balance of 
Payments 
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Table 9: Imports of Goods and Services    
        
 2007  % Change in 2008 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 % Change in 2010      2010 
           
 €m Volume Value      €m Volume Value €m Volume Value    €m 
           
Merchandise 64,268 -10.7 -10.3 57,675 -23 -21 ½ 45,275 -6 ½ -7 42,106 
Tourism 6,300 10.9 12.0 7,055 -9 ½ -10 6,350 -2 ½ -3 6,159 
Other Services 62,781 5.3 7.5 67,519 2 3 69,545 ¼ 2 70,935 
           
Imports of Goods  
  and Services 133,349 -2.1 -0.8 132,249 -9 ½ -8 ½ 121,169 -2 ½ -1 ½ 119,200 
           
FISIM Adjustment 763   753   764   776 
           
Adjusted Imports 134,112 -2.1 -0.8 133,002 -9 ½ -8 ¼ 121,933 -2 ½ -1 ½ 119,977 
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Table 10: Balance of Payments*  
        
 2007 Change 2008 Change 2009 Change 2010 
 €m % €m % €m % €m 
        
Merchandise Trade  Balance 19,811  23,820  34,590  40,155 
Service Trade Balance -1,121  -5,371  -6,812  -6,736 
 
Trade Balance in Goods and 
Services on BoP Basis 18,690  18,449  27,778  33,419 
% of GNP 11.6  11.9  20 ¾  26 
 Total Debit Flows 112,737 -1.9 110,605 -20 ¼ 88,172 -1 ¾ 86,525 
 Total Credit Flows 84,911 -1.3 83,835 -30 ½ 58,280 -5 ½ 55,056 
Net Factor Flows  -27,826 -3.8 -26,770 11 ¾ -29,892 5 ¼ -31,469 
Net Current Transfers  -990  -1,115  -1,163  -1,163 
 
Balance on Current Account -10,126  -9,436  -3,277  787 
 
Capital Transfers 39  68  300  300 
Effective Current Balance  -10,087  -9,368  -2,977  1,087 
% of GNP -6.3  -6.1  -2 ¼  ¾ 
        
* This table includes adjustments to Balance of Payments basis. 
 
merchandise trade surplus should contribute to a narrowing of the current 
account deficit, the very rapid growth in net factor income outflows means 
that the overall current account balance is expected to narrow less rapidly 
than we had previously forecasted. We now expect a deficit on the current 
account of the balance of payments of -2½ per cent of GNP in 2009, 
compared to a deficit of -6½ per cent in 2008. The narrowing of the 
current account deficit which has been taking place over the course of 2008 
and 2009 (Figure 11) is expected to continue into 2010 with the result that 
we expect a surplus on the current account of ½ per cent of GNP next 
year. Having recorded a deficit on the current account since 2003, this 
would represent a significant turnaround in Ireland’s balance of payments 
position. Changes in the flow of funds between sectors in the Irish 
economy which match these developments in the balance of payments are 
discussed further in Box 4. 
Figure 11: Current Account Balance, Annualised Numbers 
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 Table 11 provides indicators of economic growth, changes in the 
composition of growth and changes in living standards for recent years and 
for the forecast period. The first line shows the familiar GNP value, which 
we forecast will decline by 10 per cent in 2009 and by 1½  per cent in 2010. 
The fall in GNP per capita is estimated to be slightly steeper. While 
outward migration will act to reduce the population in 2009 and 2010, the 
natural increase will dominate thereby giving rise to the steeper fall in per 
capita terms.  
 
The figures on investment as a share of GNP show something of a 
transformation in the economy. While the fall-off in building has been 
painful in terms of employment and the broader impacts on the economy, 
2010 should see the end to declines in this sector.  
 
Finally, the last line in the table can be viewed as an indicator of 
competitiveness. While it is not the case that there is some target level for 
labour’s share of output, the increase in the value of the variable into 2009 
points to declining competitiveness. If our forecasts are correct, and in 
particular if wages fall by 2½  per cent in 2010, there will be a significant 
improvement in competitiveness and this is reflected in the fall in labour’s 
share in 2010 relative to 2009. 
 
Table 11: Measures of Growth 
       
Growth Indicators 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
       
GNP 5.6 6.3 4.4 -2.8 -10 -1½  
GNP adj for Terms of Trade 4.5 5.3 1.9 -4.0 -9¾  -1¼  
GNDI 4.4 4.7 1.6 -4.1 -10 -1¼  
National Resources 4.4 4.7 1.5 -4.1 -9¾  -1¼  
GNP per capita (constant 
 prices) 3.3 3.7 2.0 -4.6 -10¾  -1½  
Consumption per capita 
 (constant prices) 4.3 3.9 3.5 -2.8 -7¾  -1 
Investment in Housing/GNP 14.9 14.8 13.4 9.8 6¼  4 
Investment/GNP 31.5 31.2 30.7 25.5 19¼  15½  
Investment Building & 
 Construction/GNP 24.3 24.8 23.7 19.4 13¾  10¼  
Labour share of GNP 47.7 47.2 48.0 51.1 54½  52½  
       
 
 The latest QNA data on output indicate that total output stabilised in the 
second and third quarters of 2009. Following a dramatic quarter-on-quarter 
fall of almost 5.5 per cent in the last quarter of 2008, largely driven by a 
dramatic fall in industrial output, total output  continued to fall slightly in 
the first quarter of 2009. Figure 12 shows the weighted contributions to the 
total growth rate in output for three sectors: building and construction, 
services and industry. The recovery of industrial output in the first quarter 
of 2009 offsets the continued fall in building and construction and services 
and has contributed to stabilising total output. 
 
Measures of 
Growth 
Sectoral 
Output 
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Table 12: GDP by Sector    
        
 2007 % Change 2008 % Change 2009 % Change    2010 
           
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Agriculture 3,985 -0.9 -7.9 3,669 2 -25 2,751 1 0 2,751 
           
Industry: 55,809 -3.6 -6.5 52,163 -7 ¼ -8 ¼ 47,859 -2 ¾ -3 46,430 
Other Industry 39,633 -0.3 -3.1 38,388 1 2 39,155 2 2 ¾ 40,213 
Building & Construction 16,176 -11.7 -14.8 13,775 -30 ½ -36 ¾ 8,703 -21 ¾ -28 ½ 6,217 
           
Services: 108,571 0.3 -2.1 106,334 -3 ¼ -8 ¼ 97,529 1 ¼ -1 ¼ 96,304 
  
Public Administration & 
 Defence 5,842 1.8 6.1 6,197 -4 -8 ¾ 5,661 -3 -11 ¾ 4,990 
  
Distribution, Transport 
 and Communications 25,664 -3.3 -1.2 25,349 -8 -8 ¾ 23,131 1 1 23,352 
  
Other Services 
 (including rent) 77,065 1.4 -3.0 74,788 -1 ½ -8 68,738 1 ½ -1 ¼ 67,962 
           
GDP at Factor Cost  168,366 -1.0 -3.7 162,166 -4 ½ -8 ¾ 148,138 0 -1 ¾ 145,485 
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Figure 12: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth Rates, Weighted Contributions22, 
Seasonally Adjusted 
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Source: Quarterly National Accounts, CSO.  
Data from the industrial production index also suggest that the 
industrial sector recovered further in the third quarter, driven by growth in 
the modern sector (see Figure 13). The traditional sector continues to 
struggle, with a cumulative fall in output of over 20 per cent since the third 
quarter of 2007. This dichotomy is reflected in the performance in exports, 
where the pharmaceuticals and organic chemicals sector are performing 
strongly while total exports have been sluggish. 
Figure 13: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth Rates in Industrial Production 
Index, Seasonally Adjusted 
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Further indicators on production in the economy present a mixed 
picture. Data from the Company Registrations Office on new companies 
and closures23 (shown in Figure 14) indicate that by November 2009 there 
 
22 Weighted by shared in total constant price GDP at factor cost.   
23 The figure for total closures is calculated as the sum of total company liquidations, 
examinerships and receiverships in each period.  
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was the highest rate of company closures and lowest rate of new company 
registrations since 1991. Data from Eirgrid24 indicate there was a sharp 
decline in electricity demand in the first part of 2009, since then it has 
stabilised. 
Figure 14: New Companies and Closures 
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Our estimates for 2009 suggest that total industry excluding building 
and construction will increase by 1 per cent. For 2010 we expect a pick-up 
in world trade and our forecast of a modest increase in the demand for 
Irish merchandise exports to result in total industrial output excluding 
building and construction increasing by 2 per cent. For construction, we 
estimate that total output will fall by  30½ per cent in 2009 and  21¾ per 
cent in 2010. These numbers are discussed in the Investment section. For 
services, we expect a pick-up in private sector services in 2010, especially in 
the second half of the year when consumption is forecast to pick up. Given 
a further decline in publicly provided services due to the measures 
introduced in Budget 2010, we estimate that total services will increase only 
marginally by 1¼ per cent. 
 
For the agricultural sector, 2009 has been a disastrous year. The recently 
released CSO estimates of output, input and income in agriculture for 2009 
show an overall decline in the operating surplus of over 30 per cent 
compared to 2008. This decline was driven by sharp falls in the value of 
agricultural output especially milk and cereals. We estimate that total output 
fell by 2 per cent, with a 21 per cent fall in average output prices. This 
means that farm incomes fell by 25 per cent, an extraordinarily large 
decline. For 2010 we expect that the recent recovery in dairy and beef 
prices will persist into 2010, with average prices falling only slightly 
together a modest recovery in volume output of 1 per cent.  
 
 
 
24 http://www.eirgrid.com/operations/systemperformancedata/electricitystatistics/ 
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The latest trends in the labour market are summarised in Figures 15 and 
16. Looking first at Figure 16, it can be seen that employment falls and 
increases in the rate of unemployment persisted into the third quarter of 
2009. Employment has now been falling since the first quarter of 2008 
(quarter-on-quarter, seasonally adjusted). Unadjusted, employment peaked 
at 2.15 million in Q3 2007; in Q3 2009 it was measured at 1.92 million, a 
fall of over 220,000 or approximately 10 per cent. In the year ended Q3 
2009, employment fell by 183,000 or 8.8 per cent. 
 
Unemployment has also continued to rise and was recorded at 12.4 per 
cent in Q3 (or 12.7 per cent unadjusted). According to the Live Register, 
the seasonally adjusted standardised unemployment rate was 12.5 per cent 
in November so it appears that some stabilisation in the trend in 
unemployment is occurring. This is reflected in the pattern of monthly 
increases in the numbers on the Live Register, as shown in Figure 15. 
Figure 15: The Unemployment Rate and Quarter-on-Quarter % Change in 
Employment, Seasonally Adjusted 
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Source: Quarterly National Household Survey , CSO.  
 
In addition to employment falls, the latest QNHS shows a fall in the 
labour force of 63,000 in the year ended Q3 2009, a fall of 2.8 per cent. A 
number of factors lie beneath this figure. First, the participation rate is 
falling. In Q3 2008, the participation rate was 64.2 per cent; in Q3 2009 it 
was down to 62.5 per cent. With approximately 3.5 million people in 
Ireland aged over 15 years, every 1 percentage point fall in participation 
amounts to 35,000 people. Hence, the fall in participation between Q3 
2008 and 2009 translates into a labour force fall of 53,600. The CSO 
estimate that the remaining 10,600 fall in the labour force is made up of 
demographic factors, i.e. migration and population ageing. We know from 
the QNHS that there were 40,500 fewer non-nationals in the labour force 
in Q3 2009 relative to Q3 2008. This suggests that around 30,000 Irish 
people entered the labour force through ageing, i.e. turning 15 years, or 
return migration and this is consistent with the CSO estimate that the 
number of Irish people in the labour force fell by 23,000 between Q3 2008 
and Q3 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Employment  
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Table 13: Employment and Unemployment  
  
 Annual Averages 000s 
     
 2007   2008   2009     2010 
  
Agriculture 111 115 98 90 
Industry 564 520 412 371 
Services 1,448 1,465 1,420 1,393 
     
Total at Work 2,123 2,100 1,930 1,854 
Unemployed 101 141 258 298 
  
Labour Force 2,224 2,241 2,188 2,152 
Unemployment Rate % 4.6 6.3 11 ¾ 13 ¾ 
Net Migration 67.3 38.5 -7.8 -40.0 
   of which: Inward Migration 109.5 83.8 57.3 30.0 
Change in Participation Rate* 1.1 -0.3 -1 ¼ -1 ¼ 
     
•Note: Participation rate measured as share of population aged 15-64 years; based on Q2 
figures as are migration figures. 
 
Figure 16: Monthly Increase in the Live Register, Seasonally Adjusted 
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Other interesting dimensions of the QNHS data are the trend in part-
time and full-time employment and in hours worked. The total fall in 
employment in the year of almost 185,000 is made up of a fall in full-time 
employment of over 202,000 and a rise in part-time employment of almost 
18,000. Average hours worked has fallen from 36.3 hours in Q3 2008 to 
35.5 hours in Q3 2009, a fall of 2.2 per cent. These trends are consistent 
with those discussed in the box on earnings where reductions in hours 
worked appear to be playing a significant role in adjusting to depressed 
economic conditions. 
 
Turning to our forecasts, we expect employment to average 1.93 million 
in 2009, falling to 1.85 million in 2010. These figures imply employment 
falls of almost 8 per cent in 2009 and 4 per cent in 2010. While the rate of 
job losses is unlikely to match that of Q1 2009, we still expect to see 
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employment falls due to reductions in the public sector, in the banking and 
financial sector and in construction, with subsequent effects on 
employment elsewhere. We expect the rate of unemployment to peak at 14 
per cent next year. The fall in participation which has been observed in 
recent quarters is expected to continue into next year. We expect to see a  
fall of 1 percentage point in participation in 2010, following an expected 
decline of 1¼  percentage points this year. 
 
As regards migration, we expect net outward migration of 40,000 in the 
year ending April 2010. As noted above, the non-Irish national population 
(aged over 15 years) is estimated to be 44,800 lower in Q3 2009 relative to 
the same quarter twelve months earlier. Given that employment among 
non-Irish nationals is down 61,600 over the same period (or almost 20 per 
cent) it is unsurprising that an outflow would emerge. The impact of the 
current recession on the migration behaviour of Irish people is less clear at 
this stage, although media stories are now beginning to appear detailing 
examples of outward migration.  
 
 The most recent earnings statistics available from the CSO relate to the 
second quarter of 2009, and are currently limited to the industry, financial 
and public sectors. Figure 17 shows the annualised growth rates in average 
weekly earnings across the various sectors. Growth in industrial earnings 
remains strong, estimated at 4 per cent in the year ending 2009 Q2. Weekly 
earnings in the financial and insurance sector fell sharply in the first two 
quarters of the year, contributing to an annualised decline of 4.5 per cent in 
Q2. As shown, annual wage growth in the public sector moderated 
considerably in the second quarter of the year. This was largely due to the 
imposition of the public sector pension levy, which we have treated as a 
wage cut.25 
Figure 17: Annual Wage Growth (%), Weekly Earnings 
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25 In the official data series provided by the CSO, earnings represent the gross amount 
payable by the organisation to its employees before deduction of tax, PRSI and other 
levies, including the pension levy. However, for the purpose of our own analysis, we have 
treated the pension levy as a nominal wage cut amounting to 7 per cent of average public 
sector earnings.  
Incomes 
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Table 14: Personal Disposable Income    
        
 2007 Change  2008 Change       2009 Change 2010 
           
 €m % €m €m % €m         €m % €m €m 
           
Agriculture, etc. 3,249 -11.0 -359 2,890 -25 -723 2,168 0 0 2,168 
Non-Agricultural Wages 77,328 2.1 1,601 78,929 -8 ¾ -6,811 72,118 -6 ¼ -4,425 67,693 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 15,440 26.5 4,098 19,539 -12 ¾ -2,498 17,041 1 177 17,218 
           
Total Income Received 96,018 5.6 5,340 101,358 -10 -10,032 91,327 -4 ¾ -4,248 87,079 
Current Transfers 21,674 12.1 2,631 24,305 8 ½ 2,054 26,359 8 ¼ 2,147 28,506 
           
Gross Personal Income 117,692 6.8 7,971 125,663 -6 ¼ -7,978 117,686 -1 ¾ -2,101 115,585 
Direct Personal Taxes 23,559 -1.0 -226 23,332 -6 -1,394 21,938 1 ¼ 257 22,194 
           
Personal Disposable Income  94,134 8.7 8,197 102,331 -6 ½ -6,583 95,748 -2 ½ -2,357 93,390 
Consumption 91,948 2.1 1,915 93,863 -9 ¾ -9,189 84,674 -1 ½ -1,266 83,408 
Personal Savings 2,186   8,468   11,074   9,983 
Savings Ratio 2.3   8.3   11 ½   10 ¾ 
Average Personal Tax Rate 20.0   18.6   18 ¾   19 ¼ 
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The trend that emerges from the earnings data varies considerably, 
depending on the measure of earnings used. The best example of this is 
seen in the financial sector earnings. As mentioned above, average weekly 
earnings in this sector fell by 4.5 per cent in Q2 on an annualised basis. In 
the same period, average hourly earnings fell by 3.6 per cent, while average 
hourly earnings excluding bonuses actually increased by 4.1 per cent. The 
trend in weekly earnings might suggest that nominal wage reductions have 
occurred in this sector. However, the additional evidence on hourly 
earnings indicates that employers may be reducing their labour costs by 
adjusting weekly hours worked and by reducing or removing bonus 
payments. This issue is discussed in greater detail in the Box on private 
sector earnings below.  
 
The evidence suggests that there have not been widespread nominal 
wage reductions yet, in spite of the extensive anecdotal evidence. However, 
an actual reduction in earnings is undoubtedly central to our analysis given 
the implications for competitiveness. Our forecast for wage growth in 2009 
is unchanged from our last Commentary – we expect wages to fall by 1 per 
cent this year. As mentioned above, this takes account of the public sector 
pension levy, which we treat as a pay cut. Our forecast for 2010 is also 
unchanged – we expect wages to fall by 2½ per cent, taking account of the 
public sector pay cuts announced in the Budget and assuming further 
reductions in earnings in the private sector. 
 
Combined with our employment projections, these forecasts imply a 10 
per cent fall in total income received in 2009. Current transfers are 
expected to increase by 8½ per cent this year, while direct taxes are forecast 
to fall by 6 per cent, given the significant employment losses throughout 
the year. As a result, we expect personal disposable income to fall by 6½ 
per cent in 2009. For 2010, we expect total income received to fall by 4¾ 
per cent. We are forecasting a reduction of 8¼ per cent in current transfers, 
taking account of our revised estimate of unemployment and the 
reductions in welfare payments announced in the Budget. Combined with 
the limited change to direct taxes, these forecasts imply a 2½ per cent fall 
in personal disposable income in 2010. The projected fall in consumption 
in 2009 exceeds the projected fall in personal disposable income, resulting 
in a significant increase in the savings rate. As mentioned in the Consumption 
section, we assume that the decisive action taken in Budget 2010 removes 
an element of uncertainty for consumers regarding their likely disposable 
income levels next year. As such, we expect the savings rate to fall from 
11½ per cent in 2009 to 10¾ per cent in 2010.  
 
Box 3: Developments in Private Sector Wages 
 
It has been widely argued that a fall in nominal wage rates would facilitate a 
more rapid economic recovery, particularly a recovery in employment. 
Recent data show that average hourly earnings (excluding bonuses and 
other irregular payments) in the industry sector registered a year-on-year 
increase of 4.8 per cent in 2009 Q2. Such an increase is surprising and 
contradicts the recent anecdotal evidence of nominal wage reductions. A 
possible explanation for the observed increase in average earnings could be 
the compositional shift in employment in this sector. The extent of 
employment losses has been highest among the lower-paid occupational 
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groups. According to the EHECS26 data on employment in the industry 
sector, 95 per cent of the reduction in employment in the year ending June 
2009 was accounted for by production, transport, craft and other manual 
workers. Such a change in the composition of total employment would be 
expected to drive up average earnings per employee in the sector. However, 
as Table A shows, average hourly earnings in the industry sector increased 
at each of the three occupation levels in Q2 relative to the same period last 
year. Using the information on hourly earnings and employment by 
occupation level, we can calculate an estimate of the total industrial wage 
bill per hour. Holding employment constant at its 2007 level (i.e. assuming 
no compositional shifts in employment) we find that the hourly industrial 
wage bill still registers a year-on-year increase of 3 per cent in 2009 Q2.  
 
Table A: Year-on-Year % Change in Earnings and Hours Worked, 2009 
Q227 
 Hourly 
Earnings 
Hourly 
Earnings 
(excl. bonuses) 
Weekly 
Earnings 
Weekly 
Hours 
Worked  
Industry     
Production, Transport, 
Craft & Manual 
3.7 3.5 -1.5 -6.8 
Clerical, Sales & Service 1.8 2.3 -0.5 -4.7 
Managers, Professionals 0.4 2.4 0.6 -1.2 
Financial & Insurance 
Activities 
    
Production, Transport, 
Craft & Manual 
7.4 6.2 7.3 -5.7 
Clerical, Sales & Service -4.2 1.3 -5.4 -5.2 
Managers, Professionals -13.9 1.6 -14.9 -5.8 
Source: Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey, CSO 
 
Table A also highlights the differences in trend among the various 
measures of earnings. The weekly data suggest that wages are indeed falling, 
with the year-on-year decline particularly severe for the two higher 
occupation groups in the financial sector. The differences in trend between 
hourly and weekly earnings are partly due to changes in the number of 
hours worked per week. The EHECS data show that in both the financial 
and industry sectors, the number of hours worked per week declined in Q2 
at each occupation level, relative to the same period in 2008. This trend is 
confirmed by the employment numbers – in both sectors the share of part-
time employees in total employment has increased in the last year.  
 
A second reason for such disparity in trends among the different 
measures of earnings is the recent developments in bonus payments. This 
is most evident in the earnings of higher occupational workers in the 
financial sector. Both weekly earnings and average hourly earnings (first 
column of Table A) include all irregular payments, such as bonuses. These 
measures of earnings have registered very sharp year-on-year declines, 
particularly for financial sector managers and professionals. Given the 
difficulties experienced by companies in the financial sector over the last 
year, the reduction in (or non-payment of) bonuses is not surprising. 
However, the data on hourly earnings excluding irregular payments show a 
year-on-year increase of 1.6 per cent for managers and professionals.  
 
26 Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey, conducted by the CSO. 
27 The figures for Q2 are preliminary estimates.  
 42 
The information from the EHECS data, which to date only covers 
certain sectors of the economy, suggests that there is no formal evidence, 
as yet, of reductions in nominal wage rates. Private sector employers appear 
to be reducing their wage bills by alternative means, through the non-
payment of bonuses and a reduction in weekly hours worked. While there 
has been some anecdotal and survey evidence suggesting  that nominal 
wage reductions have been taking place since the first quarter of the year, it 
may be the case that respondents are merely observing significant 
reductions in their take-home pay. The evidence presented here would also 
provide an explanation for the lower than anticipated income tax receipts – 
a reduction in working hours and non-payment of bonuses both serve to 
reduce the amount of taxable income.  
 
A number of other important considerations should be borne in mind 
when attempting to identify trends in private sector earnings. The sectoral 
wage data based on the new EHECS survey are a relatively new series and 
they tend to display considerable volatility compared to the old series. In 
addition, the coverage of the new series is currently limited to the industrial 
and financial sectors. Based on the estimate of total employment from the 
Q2 Quarterly National Household Survey, these two sectors account for just 15 
per cent of total employment. Approximately 20 per cent of total 
employment is accounted for by public sector employees and we know that 
these workers have already faced an effective reduction in their nominal 
wages, with additional cuts due to be imposed in January. Furthermore, the 
latest data on earnings in the construction sector relate to the last quarter of 
2008. Given the persistent difficulties and the loss of employment in this 
sector, it is likely that there has been some moderation in wage rates 
throughout 2009. A considerable percentage of the workforce remains 
unaccounted for among the current earnings data and, with this in mind, a 
degree of caution must be exercised when making statements about trends 
in economy-wide wage rates.  
 
 According to the latest figures from the CSO, the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) fell by 5.7 per cent in November 2009, compared to November 
2008. This figure represents the slowest pace of price decline in five 
months, suggesting that the year-on-year inflation rate may have reached its 
trough. The pace of decline in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) has also slowed. This index fell by 2.8 per cent in November, year-
on-year. 
 
As discussed in previous Commentaries, the single biggest contributor to 
the volatility in the CPI in the recent past has been the mortgage interest 
component and this can be seen clearly in Figure 18. In early 2008, year-on-
year inflation in this sub-index was as high as 22 per cent. Eighteen months 
later, the mortgage interest component registered a year-on-year fall of 50 
per cent. However, as the rate of HICP inflation has also fallen 
considerably over the last year, there have clearly been other significant 
contributors to the developments in consumer prices28. Oil prices have 
fluctuated substantially since early 2008 and this has fed through to the 
prices of petrol, diesel and home-heating oil. As shown in Figure 18, the 
 
28 The main difference between the two indices is that the HICP does not include 
mortgage interest. It also excludes building materials, union subscriptions, car insurance, 
house insurance and car tax. 
Consumer 
Prices 
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year-on-year change in the petrol sub-index reached 14 per cent in July 
2008, before falling as low as -19 per cent in early 2009. Petrol prices have 
been rising again in recent months, as the crude oil price increases during 
the summer have fed through to pump prices. The depreciation of Sterling 
relative to the Euro since late 2007 has also affected consumer prices. The 
impact of these exchange rate movements is strongest on the prices of 
goods that are heavily imported from the UK, and so the prices of food 
items and clothing and footwear have fallen considerably over this time 
period, as shown in Figure 18.  
Figure 18: Year-on-Year Inflation by Selected Sub-indices, January 2008 - 
November 2009 
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Source: Consumer Price Index, CSO.  
 
Turning to our forecasts, we expect the CPI to fall by 4½ per cent in 
2009 and by ½ per cent in 2010. We are forecasting a fall of 1¾ per cent in 
the HICP this year, and a further fall of 1 per cent next year. We have 
revised our forecasts for 2010 downward since the last Commentary and this 
is largely due to Budget 2010. The various changes to taxation have a net 
positive effect on CPI inflation, but this effect is very low (less than 0.1 per 
cent).. We have maintained our technical assumption regarding ECB 
interest rates – we assume that the main refinancing rate will increase to 
1.75 per cent by the end of 2010, with no increase in the first six months of 
the year. In addition, we expect to see an increase in the domestic interest 
rates on variable rate mortgages, independent of any ECB increases. In the 
period 2003-2007 prior to the financial crisis, Irish interest rate margins 
were low by international standards. Margins declined further from the 
onset of the crisis due to the sharp decline in lending rates, especially for 
mortgages which are predominantly on tracker and variable rate terms 
(IMF, 2009). It appears likely that the Irish banks will raise their rates once 
NAMA is up and running, in order to restore margins and meet the costs 
of funding.  
Table 15: Inflation Measures (%) 
      
 2006 2007 2008 2009(f) 2010(f) 
CPI 3.9 4.9 4.1 -4½ -½ 
Mortgage Interest 31.4 40.4 15.0 -40 8¼ 
HICP (Ireland) 2.7 2.9 3.1 -1¾ -1 
HICP (Euro Area) 2.2 2.1 3.3 0.2 0.9 
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PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT 
The annual rate of change in headline private sector credit (PSC) declined 
in June for the first time since the Central Bank began compiling the series 
on the current basis in 1993. Since June the annual rate of change has 
continued to decline and had fallen further to -3.4 per cent by September. 
As shown in Table 16, valuation effects, including write downs of loans 
and higher bad debt provisions due to weak economic conditions, have 
contributed significantly to the decline in headline PSC over the course of 
the year. Excluding these valuation effects there has been a small decline in 
the underlying stock of private sector credit as debt repayment exceeds the 
expansion of new credit.  
 
Within the headline PSC, residential mortgages (including 
securitisations) which account for 85 per cent of household lending from 
Irish credit institutions declined in September for the sixth consecutive 
month. These are the first recorded declines in mortgage lending since the 
monthly series began in 1990. The rate of growth in mortgage lending from 
a year earlier declined to just 0.3 per cent in September, its lowest level on 
record. Total mortgage lending outstanding at the end of September stood 
at €147.9 billion.  
Table 16: Private Sector Credit 
 End-month Private Sector Credit 
 
Unadjusted 
Growth year-
on-year 
Adjusted year-
on-year 
  € million % % 
2006 February 267,861 30.1 29.4 
 March 271,364 28.7 29 
 June 288,637 27.3 30.3 
 September 302,730 25.5 28.1 
 December 317,801 22.8 25.9 
2007 March 328,265 21.0 23.2 
 June 342,774 18.8 20.2 
 September 360,112 19.0 19.5 
 December 376,796 18.6 17 
2008 March 384,340 17.1 17.1 
 June 392,937 14.6 14.1 
 September 399,143 10.8 10.5 
 December 395,070 4.9 7.3 
2009 March 392,258 2.1 2.4 
 June 387,350 -1.3 -0.8 
 September 378,086 -5.3 -3.4 
     
 
The decline in private sector credit is most likely driven by both a 
contraction in credit supply and credit demand. The ECB’s Bank Lending 
Survey provides some evidence on credit conditions.29 According to the 
 
29 Banks were asked using a 5 point scale how credit standards changed during the third 
quarter of 2009. Higher numbers (greater than 3) indicate easing supply conditions and 
greater demand, lower numbers imply the opposite while responses equal to 3 indicate no 
change from the previous survey. 
Monetary 
Sector 
Developments 
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latest survey results for the three months up to the end of October, credit 
supply has contracted reflecting tighter lending standards due to the 
balance sheet constraints of financial institutions, while credit demand has 
also weakened reflecting the difficult economic conditions and the 
weakness of the domestic economy.  
 
Based on the responses of senior lending officers in the participating 
banks, the survey results indicate that credit standards to both households 
and enterprises tightened during the third quarter of 2009. For households, 
credit standards for house purchase tightened during the third quarter but 
were unchanged for consumer credit and other lending. Demand for loans 
to enterprises declined during the third quarter and supply conditions 
remained tight.  
 
Box 4: Balance of Payments 
 
The current account of the balance of payments deteriorated significantly 
between 2003 and 2008 (Figure A).  
 
Figure A: Balance of Payments 
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The corollary to the widening deficit on the current account has been an 
increase in net investment inflows into Ireland through the financial 
account of the balance of payments.30 The scale of these investment 
inflows has been enormous. Total investment inflows increased by over 73 
per cent between 2003 and 2007, peaking at over €135 billion in the first 
quarter of 2008. The largest increase in both inflows and outflows was in 
the portfolio and other investment income categories. This is a relatively 
recent development as traditionally factor flows on the current account 
have been driven by direct investment income flows due to profit 
repatriations by foreign multinationals and the repayment of national debt 
interest abroad.  
 
30 In recent years net errors and omissions on the balance of payments has also grown, in 
2009 Q2 it stood at over €8 billion. 
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The increasing investment inflows on the financial account of the 
balance of payments were used to fund the massive increase in the share of 
building and construction investment in Ireland over this period. The 
increase in housing investment was funded through an increase in 
household borrowing through the banking system. The value of total 
residential mortgages outstanding increased by 125 per cent between 
December 2003 and December 2007, from €54 billion to €123 billion. In 
turn the banking sector financed this increase in housing investment by 
borrowing extensively from abroad as illustrated in Figure B. In 2003, the 
net indebtedness of Irish banks to the rest of the world stood at just 10 per 
cent of GDP. By the end of 2008 this had increased to almost 60 per cent. 
Funds provided by the Central bank as part of the ECB’s monetary policy 
operations are not included in the net foreign liabilities of the banking 
system.  
 
Figure B: Net Foreign Liabilities of the Banking System, % of GDP 
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During the course of 2009, the balance of payments and the net external 
position of the banking system have been changing rapidly. Underpinning 
these changes are significant developments in the flow of funds between 
sectors in the Irish economy. As illustrated in Figure C, the decline in the 
financing needs of the household sector (related to the decline in housing 
investment) as well as the increase in the household savings rate is expected 
to result in the rate of net acquisitions31 of the household sector moving 
into surplus in 2009 and 2010. The emerging surplus on the current 
account of the balance of payments, in turn matched by these 
developments in the flow of funds, contrasts with the position of other 
European countries, such as Portugal, which in 2009 will record large 
current account and government deficits.  
 
31 This is the difference between household savings and household investments in each 
calendar year. 
 47 
Figure C: Flow of Funds in the Irish Economy32 
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Deleveraging by the household and company sectors can be expected to 
result in some reduction in the net foreign liabilities of the banking system 
as Irish banks repay some of their net foreign borrowing. However, the 
dramatic decline in the net external indebtedness of Irish banks which has 
taken place over the course of 2008 and 2009 (Figure D) is not solely due 
to the repayment of banks’ foreign liabilities.  
 
Figure D: Net Foreign Liabilities of the Banking System and Credit 
Institutions Borrowing from the Central Bank, % of GDP 
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 Tensions in interbank lending markets since late 2008 hampered the 
ability of Irish banks’ to roll over their external liabilities; instead they have 
replaced this borrowing with funding from the Irish Central Bank. Figure 
D shows the sharp rise since September 2008 in Irish banks’ borrowing 
from the Central Bank. This lending to credit institutions by the Irish 
Central bank has in turn been funded by the ECB through longer-term 
 
32 The flow of funds shows the net acquisitions of the household, company and 
government sectors. These together sum to the balance on the current account of the 
balance of payments. The figures are based on own calculations. 
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refinancing operations (LTRO).33 As shown in Table XX below, lending by 
the Irish Central Bank peaked at over €130 billion in June 2009, up from 
€88 billion in December 2008. This was equivalent to over 21 per cent of 
total Euro system lending to institutions in the Euro Area, up significantly 
from an average of 6 per cent in 2007. As access to wholesale funding has 
improved with the gradual return to normality in international money 
markets and the fall in interbank lending rates, credit institutions have 
reduced their dependence on Central Bank funds as shown in Table A. In 
addition the net acquisition of assets by the household sector, as reflected 
in the flow of funds, is contributing to a reduction in the liabilities of the 
banking system, both domestic and foreign. This trend can be expected to 
persist into 2010 as the net acquisition of assets by the household sector 
continues (Figure C). The most recent Central Bank statistics for the period 
up to the end of October show a decline, for the fourth consecutive 
month, in the funds provided by the Central Bank as part of the ECB’s 
monetary policy operations. As the ECB begins the gradual withdrawal of 
emergency support measures, borrowing by financial institutions from the 
Central Bank is likely to decrease further.  
Table A: Central Bank Lending to Credit Institutions in Ireland 
  € Million    
  
Lending by 
the Irish 
Central Bank 
to Credit 
Institutions in 
Ireland in Euro 
Eurosystem 
Lending to Euro 
Area Credit 
Institutions in 
Euro, related to 
MPO 
Credit 
Institutions 
in Ireland, 
share of 
Eurosystem 
lending 
Credit 
Institutions' 
Borrowing from 
the Central 
Bank, % of GDP 
2007 March 24,020 421,633 5.7 12.7 
 June 25,535 438,038 5.8 13.5 
 September 23,751 420,169 5.7 12.5 
 December 39,449 475,324 8.3 21.0 
2008 March 34,395 483,600 7.1 19.0 
 June 38,373 460,645 8.3 21.2 
 September 58,671 471,362 12.4 39.2 
 December 88,562 613,857 14.4 54.0 
2009 March 120,628 607,356 19.9 79.8 
 June 130,423 615,980 21.2 83.9 
 September 91,573 583,939 15.7 53.9 
      
 
 
 
 
33  In June this year, €442 billion was lent to Eurosystem Central Banks’ as part of a 12-
month longer-term refinancing operation (LTRO).  Under this operation, the Eurosystem 
provides longer term refinancing to institutions in return for assets which are eligible as 
collateral in its credit operations. The ECB will offer its final 12 month refinancing 
operation in December 2009. 
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GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
2009 has been an enormously difficult year for the Irish economy. We now 
expect that GNP  will have contracted by 10 per cent. We know that the 
rate of unemployment has risen from 8.5 per cent in December 2008 to 
12.5 per cent in November 2009. The earnings of those in the public sector 
and in agriculture are well down on 2008, with pay cuts also occuring in the 
other sectors. The general government deficit for 2009 will be around 11¾  
per cent, in spite of the large corrective measures contained in Budget 2009 
(October 2008), in the additional measures introduced in February 
(including the public service pension levy) and in April’s Supplementary 
Budget. Given the events of 2009, the obvious question that arises is 
whether 2010 will bring an improvement in the fortunes of the Irish 
economy and whether, as stated in the Budget 2010 speech, “the worst is 
over”. 
 
At the macro-level, our forecasts suggest that the worst is over and that 
the rate of economic contraction experienced in 2009 will not continue. 
However, we do expect GNP to be lower in 2010 relative to 2009, by 1½  
per cent, as a result of on-going falls in output in the first half of the year. 
We also expect the rate of unemployment to rise further, peaking at close 
to 14 per cent in the latter part of 2010. In general, we see 2010 as a year in 
which the recession of 2008/9 will end, with a return to modest growth 
occurring in the second half of the year. 
 
While our expectations for 2010 are modest, we can envisage a return to 
a reasonable pace of economic growth in 2011 subject to favourable 
developments in a number of areas. We have identified these areas in 
setting out our thoughts on the economy in earlier Commentaries so we will 
do so again here.  
 
Let us begin with the international environment. Possibly the best 
economic news of 2009 came in the GDP figures for Q2 when it was 
shown that Germany, France and Japan had emerged from recession earlier 
than expected. These positive developments were added to in Q3 when the 
Euro Area and the US also emerged from recession. It remains uncertain as 
to whether the growth that we are observing in the world’s major 
economies will be sustained. However, the prospects for the major 
economies have brightened measurably during the course of 2009 and so it 
now appears that there will be a supportive international environment 
facing Ireland during 2010 and 2011. 
 
The next area of importance from the perspective of recovery is the 
public finances. As is the case with the international context, it is possible 
to have substantially more confidence at the end of 2009 relative to the 
beginning. This is because of the decisive action taken by the government 
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both in February, in announcing the public sector pension levy, in the April 
Supplementary Budget and more recently in Budget 2010. 
 
Beginning with our Commentary of Autumn 2008, we argued that the 
public finances had moved onto a trajectory that was unsustainable and 
which threatened to impede recovery. As a result, it was necessary to put in 
place a strategy through which the structural deficit would be reduced over 
a series of budgets. This would mean that sustainability could be restored 
to the public finances without imposing unduly contractionary Budgets in 
any one year. In advance of Budget 2010, we argued that the €4 billion of 
savings set out in the Supplementary Budget of April was appropriate. We 
also argued that the balance of adjustment should be made via expenditure 
reductions, based on the international evidence on the relative impacts of 
tax increases and expenditure cuts in the context of fiscal correction. On 
both counts, Budget 2010 was in line with what would generally be 
considered as sound fiscal management, a macro level, and should 
contribute to restoring confidence in the economy and in the policymaking 
process both nationally and internationally. Some micro-elements of the 
Budget are perhaps more open to criticism, such as the exclusion of all 
pensions from any reductions regardless of the wealth of the individuals 
concerned. Similarly, the car scrappage scheme is also open to the criticism 
that it may simply lead to a substitution in spending as opposed to 
generating new spending. Such schemes have been employed elsewhere but 
typically in countries where cars are produced. 
 
Further corrective action will be needed in 2011 and beyond. The 
announcement in the Budget that property taxes and water charges will 
form part of this adjustment can again be welcomed, based on previous 
ESRI research and on the report of the Commission on Taxation. We have 
argued that further increases in taxation would have to form part of the 
overall strategy to correct the public finances, even if 2010 was not the 
appropriate year in which to introduce such tax changes. A property tax 
will represent a broadening of the tax base; charging for water will raise 
revenue and will also provide correct incentives for water usage. In this 
context, the announcement in this Budget of the introduction of a carbon 
tax is also a correct move, based on both environmental and tax 
broadening principles. 
 
Competitiveness has been a theme in the QEC since long before the 
present crisis but the importance for Ireland of regaining the ground lost in 
the middle and latter parts of this decade is now more acute. Ireland now 
needs to generate an internal devaluation, with prices and wages falling, 
mirroring the impact of a currency devaluation which is, of course, no 
longer possible. Looking first at the general price level, relative movements 
in prices between Ireland and both the Euro Area and the UK are positive 
from Ireland’s perspective. As shown in Table 1, HICP inflation in the 
Euro Area is expected to be 0.2 per cent in 2009 and 0.9 per cent in 2010; 
the corresponding figures for the UK are 2.1 and 2.7 per cent. For Ireland, 
HICP inflation is expected to be -1¾ per cent this year and -1 per cent in 
2010.34  
 
34 It should be noted that any further weakening of Sterling would counteract the benefits 
of relative price movements between Ireland and the UK. Of course, the weakness of 
Sterling has itself contributed to the different inflationary trajectories between the two 
countries.  
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Turning to wages, and as discussed in the Box on earnings above, our 
expectation from earlier in the year that wage cuts would be a widespread 
feature of the economy in 2009 has not materialised, at least when 
measured by hourly earnings in industry. The evidence that is available 
appears to suggest that the main route of labour adjustment in the private 
sector has been through reductions in overtime payments and bonuses and 
also through reductions in hours worked.  
 
As discussed in Bergin et al. (2009)35, wage reductions across the 
economy of the order of 5 per cent would be needed for noticeable 
competitiveness gains to be realised. For this reason, the failure to observe 
such falls during the course of 2009 is a concern. Given the radical steps 
taken with respect to public sector wages, it might be that a demonstration 
effect will be seen in wage setting in 2010. Our forecasts include an 
expectation of wage falls of 2½  per cent in 2010 (including the public 
sector wage cuts). A failure for this to materialise could significantly weaken 
recovery prospects. 
 
The fourth area in which positive developments are needed is the 
banking sector. Without a healthy banking system with both capital and a 
willingness to lend, recovery will be difficult to achieve, if not impossible. 
As we have argued before, the creation of NAMA may contribute to 
returning Ireland’s banking system to good health, although the full 
implications for the taxpayer remain unclear. However, there remains 
uncertainty over the capital needs of the banks post-NAMA and whether 
these needs will be met by private sources. The discussion above on the 
flow of funds in the economy and the positive impacts on the banks of 
private sector deleveraging add some hope to the overall picture but 
concerns remain. 
 
As a final note, we think it is worth drawing attention to the value in 
having a broad political consensus behind the overall budgetary target of €4 
billion in savings for Budget 2010. Discussions of the origins of the Celtic 
Tiger sometimes point to the Tallaght Strategy36 as being one of the factors 
which gave rise to the years of growth after the late 1980s. While no such 
strategy  is explicitly in place right now on the part of the opposition 
parties, the consensus around the macro target appears to be facilitating 
appropriate fiscal management. 
 
35 Bergin, A. T. Conefrey, J. Fitz Gerald and I Kearney, 2009. Recovery Scenarios for Ireland. 
ESRI Research Series No. 7, Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute. 
36 This refers to the commitment by the then Fine Gael leader and Leader of the 
Opposition Alan Dukes not to oppose the government when appropriate fiscal action was 
being taken,. 
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JUNIOR CYCLE EDUCATION: 
INSIGHTS FROM A 
LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF 
STUDENTS 
Emer Smyth* 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 There is considerable debate at the moment about the nature of junior 
cycle education in Ireland. Much information relevant to this debate has 
been obtained from a study which tracked the progress of students through 
second-level education. This on-going longitudinal study yields many 
significant insights into the processes shaping student experiences of the 
educational system. A cohort of 900 students in 12 case-study schools has 
been surveyed and interviewed since their entry to first year. The schools 
included in the study were selected to capture key dimensions of variation 
in school organisation, namely, the approach to subject choice, the 
approach to ability grouping, and the kinds of personal and social support 
structures put in place for students. This study, the first of its kind in 
Ireland, provides significant insights into the processes shaping student 
experiences and outcomes. Three books** have been published to date 
presenting findings on junior cycle experiences.  
 
 
Moving into second-level education evokes contradictory emotions 
among students; they are excited about going to a new school but nervous 
about what lies ahead of them. The primary and second-level sectors are 
distinctive in their organisation and structure, requiring students to adapt to 
a very different setting on making the transition. Students in first year have 
several teachers rather than one, and, in many cases, are moving to a larger 
school with a longer school day. Their relations with their teachers and 
peers are also different; having more teachers often means a more formal 
relationship with school staff and many students are required to build new 
friendship networks.  
 
Moving from primary to second-level schooling means encountering a 
new curriculum. Students take more subjects, typically 13-14, in first year 
than they had in primary school and are exposed to new knowledge 
domains. Students are generally positive about the new subjects they take in 
junior cycle, particularly subjects with a more practical basis, such as Art, 
Materials Technology (Wood) and Physical Education. However, where 
they study the same subjects as in primary school (Irish, English and 
Maths, for example), many students report discontinuity in the standard 
taught or in the teaching approach used.  
 
 
* emer.smyth@esri.ie 
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Schools handle the transition process in different ways. Almost all 
schools have an open day prior to students arriving and/or an induction 
day to familiarise first year students with the rules and practices of the new 
school. In the majority of cases, a class tutor has responsibility for an in-
coming class and helps students to adjust to the new school setting. 
Around half of all second-level schools have student mentors, where older 
students take responsibility for looking after a small group of first year 
students.  
 
In spite of facing a very different school setting, most students adapt 
quickly to their new school. However, a minority of students – about one 
in six – take longer to settle in. To some extent, this process reflects the 
background characteristics of students – girls report taking longer to settle 
in than boys, newcomer (immigrant) and Traveller students take longer to 
adapt, and students who were already disaffected by their primary 
experiences have greater adjustment difficulties. However, the way in which 
the transition process is managed by the school significantly affects the ease 
of transition. Students settle in if they have more realistic expectations 
about what second-level school will be like; this can be facilitated through 
formal visits to the school beforehand or informally through information 
provided by siblings and friends. Formal student integration programmes 
help students to settle in, but only if they are underpinned by a positive 
school climate, that is, by positive interaction between teachers and 
students, and among students themselves. Many students express 
reluctance to approach teachers about personal problems such as bullying; 
student mentors, therefore, provide a way of addressing student problems 
and are generally seen favourably by first year students. Continuity in 
curriculum also facilitates student integration into the new school as does 
access to subjects with a more practical orientation.  
 
 The junior cycle is a three-year programme which is formally assessed 
largely on the basis of written exams at the end of third year. After the 
settling-in period of first year, second year is often characterised by 
teachers as one of ‘drift’ on the part of students. Without the focus of an 
examination, they are seen as becoming more disengaged and ‘difficult’ 
than previously. However, our research indicates that second year is 
actually a key period in students’ longer-term engagement with schooling. 
First year involves a certain degree of turbulence for all students as they 
adjust to the new school setting. By second year, however, two distinct 
groups of students are evident. The first group is more highly engaged in 
schoolwork, they find schoolwork challenging but invest more time in 
homework and study than they did in first year. This group is 
disproportionately made up of female students, those from middle-class 
(professional) backgrounds, and those in mixed ability or higher stream 
base classes. In contrast, the second group of students is drifting or even 
actively disengaging from schoolwork and is investing less time in 
homework/study than previously. This group is disproportionately made 
up of male students, those from working-class backgrounds and those 
allocated to lower stream classes. This differentiation has a longer term 
impact on student achievement in third year. 
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The presence of the Junior Certificate examination is found to set the 
tone for student experiences in a number of ways: the teaching methods 
used, the amount of work assigned to students and teacher expectations, 
the use of private tuition (‘grinds’), and student perceptions of school 
climate. Students in the study were asked about the kinds of teaching 
approaches which they felt facilitated their learning. Third year students 
generally prefer techniques that allow them to have more autonomy in the 
learning process whereas a strictly teacher-led approach is considered less 
helpful. Students highlight the importance of interaction in class whereby 
everybody can contribute and discussions are encouraged. However, both 
students and teachers report that third year represents a move away from 
‘fun’ activities (such as group work, quizzes and projects), a ‘need to 
knuckle down to the books’, and a greater emphasis on monitoring student 
behaviour in class.  
 
The majority of students report increased demands in terms of 
schoolwork and homework in third year compared with earlier years. In 
particular, students’ time investment in homework and study increases 
significantly between second and third year. Many students have spoken of 
increasing ‘pressure’ in third year and of difficulties in juggling the demands 
of homework and revision. In some cases, especially among some groups 
of girls, this pressure is seen as a significant source of stress. In an effort to 
assist them with their studies, a significant minority (a quarter) of third year 
students take private tuition (‘grinds’) outside school.  
 
In tandem with the changes in teaching and learning, interaction 
between teachers and students appears to change in nature over the course 
of junior cycle, with positive interaction in the form of praise or positive 
feedback becoming less prevalent and negative interaction in the form of 
being reprimanded by teachers becoming increasingly prevalent. There is 
an overall decline in the extent to which students are positive about school 
and their teachers as they move through junior cycle, reflecting, at least in 
part, the changing school climate. 
 
Each Junior Certificate subject can be taken at one of three levels: 
higher, ordinary and (for English, Irish and Maths) foundation. Six of the 
twelve case-study schools used streaming, allocating students to their base 
classes according to their assessed ability in first year. Streaming practices 
are found to have a significant impact on student experiences. Students 
allocated to lower stream classes are much more likely to disengage from 
school, and many report feeling insufficiently challenged by schoolwork. In 
streamed schools, the subject level taken is generally linked to the base class 
attended, with lower stream classes usually allocated to ordinary or 
foundation levels. As a result, students in lower stream classes take an 
average of one subject at higher level compared with almost six for those in 
higher stream classes and almost seven for those in mixed ability base 
classes. In schools with mixed ability base classes, choice of subject level is 
usually the result of a negotiation process between teacher and student, 
although the way this process operates varies across schools and teachers. 
Overall, the case-study schools vary markedly in the take-up of higher level 
subjects, even controlling for students’ initial academic ability; this reflects 
differences in school policy (for example, regarding the use of streaming) 
but also the interaction between teacher and student expectations. The 
choice of subject levels is important because of its consequences for 
achievement in the Junior Certificate examination as well as for access to 
higher level subjects at senior cycle.  
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 The study provides important evidence on the factors which influence 
student performance in the Junior Certificate examination. Students come 
to second-level education with very different performance levels in reading 
and maths. As might be expected, reading and maths test scores at the 
beginning of first year are strongly predictive of exam performance three 
years later. However, there is significant variation across schools in student 
academic outcomes, controlling for initial performance. Thus, school and 
classroom process can make a crucial difference to how students fare 
academically.  
 
Ability grouping is strongly predictive of examination performance, with 
students in lower stream classes achieving 2.5 grade points (out of a 
maximum of 10) per subject less than students of similar ability levels 
attending mixed ability base classes. This reflects the ceiling on 
achievement set by the lack of access to higher level subjects among lower 
stream students. More crucially, it is also indicative of lower teacher and 
student expectations within lower stream classes.  
 
Aspects of school climate are found to have a crucial impact on 
academic outcomes. Some students, especially working-class boys, get 
caught up in a cycle of ‘acting up’ and ‘being given out to’ by teachers, 
especially from second year onwards. Students appear to become 
disaffected if they feel that the rules of the school, and their treatment by 
teachers, are unfair or arbitrary. Even more academically engaged students 
feel little sense of ownership over the school rules as currently formulated. 
Student misbehaviour and negative teacher-student interaction are 
associated with significantly lower Junior Certificate examination grades. 
 
Second year experiences emerge as crucial in other respects. Many 
students take time to come to terms with the demands of schoolwork after 
making the transition to second-level education; however, students who 
still report having difficulties with schoolwork in second year tend to 
underperform subsequently. Given the nature of the Junior Certificate 
examination, it is not surprising that time spent on homework and study in 
third year pays off in terms of examination results. Longer term 
engagement has an additional impact, however, since students who were 
drifting or disengaging in second year receive lower examination grades. 
Life outside school also influences academic outcomes since students who 
work part-time during term-time and those who have a very active social 
life tend to achieve lower examination grades than other students, all else 
being equal.  
 
The research team is continuing to analyse findings from the 
longitudinal study to explore the transition to senior cycle and the prelude 
to the Leaving Certificate examination. Junior cycle experiences are found 
to influence the types of opportunities and pathways open to students at 
senior cycle, which are in turn likely to influence examination outcomes 
and post-school pathways. Emerging findings highlight the crucial role of 
experiences at junior cycle for young people’s later engagement with 
learning.  
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Findings from the longitudinal study raise a number of issues for policy 
development regarding junior cycle education. It is evident that the 
presence of the Junior Certificate exam influences the nature of teaching 
and learning, especially in third year, with the focus narrowing to one of 
preparation for the exam. This finding is very much in keeping with 
research on high stakes testing internationally, since both students and 
teachers will respond to the presence of such tests. The use of different 
forms of assessment might have the potential to change the focus of 
teaching and learning to one which better facilitates student engagement. 
However, it is clear that assessment is not the only issue. In spite of a 
relatively centralised second-level system in Ireland, schools have a certain 
degree of discretion over key aspects of organisation and process. The 
findings indicate that schools can make a positive difference to student 
engagement and performance in a number of ways – by adopting a more 
flexible approach to ability grouping and promoting the take-up of higher 
level subjects, by using diverse teaching methods to actively engage 
students in learning, by focusing on positive behaviour rather than negative 
sanction in responding to pupil misbehaviour, and by promoting a positive 
climate with good relations between teachers and students. The study 
highlights the importance of supporting schools to better facilitate student 
engagement in learning.  
 
 
** This study has been funded by the National Council for Curriculum and 
Assessment, and the Department of Education and Science. Findings have 
been published in: 
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INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
RENEWABLES IN IRELAND† 
∗John Fitz Gerald, Seán Lyons and Laura Malaguzzi Valeri 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 Like other countries, Ireland is trying to decrease greenhouse gas 
emissions while keeping electricity prices low. One of the main ways to 
reduce greenhouse gases is to switch electricity generation from fossil fuels 
to renewable sources, but this tends to increase electricity prices. Two 
features combine to make the Irish situation different:  
 
• As a small island market, Ireland’s electricity system is relatively 
isolated. All things equal, this tends to lead to higher costs of 
generation for a given security of supply standard.  
 
• Ireland’s main source of renewable energy is wind. Electricity can 
only be generated from wind when the wind is blowing at 
appropriate speeds, which in Ireland happens on average about a 
third of the time. Because wind power is intermittent, other sources 
of generation must be ready to step in and meet demand.  
 
Two recent papers** provide insights into how best to plan for Ireland’s 
future electricity needs. They show how better links to the British grid are 
necessary to allow more effective use of clean wind power and to partly 
overcome the problems posed by its intermittent availability. They also 
analyse the constraints on expanding wind energy. Diffney, Fitz Gerald, 
Lyons and Malaguzzi Valeri (2009) evaluate the costs and benefits of 
increasing wind generation on the all-island electricity market that started in 
November 2007. Historically, there has been wide variation in the price of 
oil and the price of natural gas, which in 2008 fuelled about 60 per cent of 
Ireland’s electricity generation. The study takes this volatility into account 
and considers three different scenarios on fuel prices, focusing on the year 
2020. The authors also consider the effects of different levels of 
interconnection between the electricity systems of Ireland and Great 
Britain. At the moment there is only one electricity interconnector that runs 
between Scotland and Northern Ireland, but a second – between Ireland 
and Wales – is planned for completion by 2012.  
 
The study finds that for a small and relatively isolated market such as 
Ireland, a high penetration of wind is economically sound only if it is 
accompanied by an increase in interconnection to Great Britain. In the 
absence of greater interconnection some of the available wind generation 
 
† Support from the Energy Policy Research Centre is gratefully acknowledged. 
∗ john.fitz gerald@esri.ie; sean.lyons@esri.ie; laura malaguzzivaleri@esri.ie 
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will necessarily have to be left idle to maintain the reliability of the system. 
Not surprisingly, for low fuel prices the lowest system costs are achieved 
when wind penetration is low (2000 megawatts in this study), whereas for 
high fuel prices high levels of wind generation are optimal (6000 megawatts 
in this study). If wind reaches 6000 megawatts by 2020, Ireland is likely to 
achieve the government’s target of producing 40 per cent of electricity 
from renewables by that date. The impact of wind generation on electricity 
prices means that wind power is likely to provide a hedge against the 
consequences of high fuel prices. 
 
The level of investment needed in the electricity sector in the near future 
is extremely large when one considers the joint effect of building more 
wind-farms and the need to extend and upgrade transmission and 
distribution lines. Transmission and distribution need to be upgraded 
because many lines are ageing and more lines are needed to accommodate 
the increase in wind generation and the complementary investment in new 
interconnection. This highlights the need to keep capital costs down. 
Maintaining regulatory certainty is vital in the all-island market since it will 
allow banks to assess the risks more easily and, therefore, result in lower 
financing costs. 
 
The high level of future investment in transmission and distribution 
suggests that it is also important to keep maintenance costs low. In most 
developed economies employees working in the utilities sectors (water, 
natural gas and electricity) earn more than manufacturing workers. 
However, in the Republic of Ireland the ratio of utility worker’s pay to 
manufacturing worker’s pay is significantly larger than in other European 
countries. If labour costs in Ireland remain high, the cost of updating 
transmission and distribution networks may be greater than necessary. 
There has, however, been a shift towards subcontracting maintenance work 
through competitive bidding, putting downward pressure on costs, and this 
trend should be encouraged. 
 
The study highlights the importance of putting in place the right amount 
of electricity interconnection to Great Britain and of ensuring that its 
operation and governance are efficient. If the interconnector does not work 
efficiently the benefits of increased wind on the system will be smaller. 
Malaguzzi Valeri (2009) in another recent study shows that most of the 
gains from interconnection between Ireland and Great Britain derive from 
the difference in electricity generating portfolios in Ireland and Great 
Britain. Great Britain relies more on coal-fuelled and nuclear generation 
whereas Ireland relies more on generation fuelled by natural gas. Malaguzzi 
Valeri (2009) shows that there are decreasing returns to investment in 
interconnection, both for society as a whole and for interconnector 
investors in particular. Returns decrease particularly quickly for 
independent interconnector owners, in part because they are unable to 
capture all the positive externalities from interconnection, such as increased 
returns to generators or lower greenhouse gas emissions in electricity 
generation. Increased interconnection also lowers the cost of electricity 
reserves (not measured directly in this study), which further widens the gap 
between interconnector returns and the returns to society. Privately owned 
interconnectors are, therefore, likely to invest less than would be socially 
optimal, which suggests that there is a role for public investment in 
interconnection.  
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COPING WITH POPULATION 
CHANGE IN IRELAND: THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTHCARE 
 
Richard Layte* 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 Health and health care are particularly sensitive to the size and make-up 
of the population. As in most other affluent nations, life expectancy in 
Ireland has been increasing strongly in recent decades. This is to be 
celebrated and attests to real improvements in Irish society. Nonetheless, 
older people require both more health care, on average, than younger 
people and a different combination of services. Population ageing is not the 
only demographic challenge we face however. Relatively high numbers of 
births and recent inward migration have led to a larger population, and in 
combination with increased life expectancy, will lead to further increases in 
population in the future. This will exert increasing pressure on Irish health 
care resources. Effective planning for the consequences of these trends will 
be crucial in determining how successful we are in coping with the 
associated challenges.  
 
A report** analysing the impact of changes in the size and composition 
of the population change on health needs and the healthcare system was 
published recently. The analysis was undertaken by a consortium of 
researchers from the ESRI and Trinity College Dublin and supported by 
the Health Research Board and Health Service Executive. The report 
showed that there will be significant population growth and ageing between 
2009 and 2021. The central demographic projection estimates that the 
population will grow overall from 4.24 million in 2006 to between 4.71 
million and 5.1 million by 2021 depending on migration developments. The 
age composition of the population will change with the proportion aged 
under 5 years projected to fall absolutely (by 32,000) and relatively (by 1.2 
per cent). Those aged 65+ will increase from 11 per cent to 15.4 per cent 
of the population, with those aged 85+ increasing from 1.1 per cent to 2.1 
per cent which represents an absolute increase of 42,900 individuals. The 
fall in the proportion of younger age groups will be most pronounced in 
Western and Southern counties. 
 
Based upon current utilisation patterns these demographic changes 
would imply: 
 
• 5,214 more inpatient beds and 1,022 more day beds in Irish 
hospitals. This is a 54 per cent increase in inpatient beds and a 64 
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per cent increase in day beds between 2007 and 2020 or a total bed 
growth requirement of 4 per cent per annum. 
 
• General practice consultations may increase by about one-third 
among those aged 16+ between 2006 and 2021 – a figure that 
could rise to close to half if projected changes in morbidity in the 
population are realised over the same period. 
 
• Outpatient consultations may rise by about a quarter on a current 
use basis but integration of trends from the period from 2001 to 
2006 would see the proportionate increase in consultations in 2021 
rise by almost 60 per cent over 2006. Worsening epidemiological 
trends would increase this requirement still further. 
 
• Projections of prescribing to 2021 estimate that total ingredient 
costs will escalate to €1.5 billion on a current use basis and €2.4 
billion if past trends from 1995-2006 prevail from €1.06 billion in 
2006. These are increases of 42 per cent and 126 per cent. 
 
• Our preferred projection of demand for residential long-term care 
for people aged 65 years and over in 2021 is 35,200 places or 
35,820 including current unmet need. This suggests a requirement 
for an additional 13,324 long-term care places or 59 per cent. This 
is 888 places per annum from 2007-2021 for people aged 65 years 
and over assuming an unchanged acute care system. 
 
The increased demand for health care likely to stem from demographic 
and epidemiological change in the Irish population is significant. Even if 
national finances improve substantially, the current way in which care is 
delivered will be unsustainable within any reasonable budget given the 
nature of demographic change. This demands a reconfiguration and 
intensification in the use of health care resources and improvements in 
levels of efficiency. Changes in the manner in which current resources are 
used and a reorganisation of services will moderate the extent of 
investment in services required: 
 
• A full implementation of the 2001 Primary Care Strategy would 
make better use of existing primary care resources and moderate 
the impact of population ageing and GP ageing and feminisation. 
Similarly, more and better use could be made of other medical 
professionals, such as practice nurses and pharmacists.  
 
• However, even with restructuring the number of GPs being trained 
in Ireland will need to increase to keep pace with demographic 
developments. Implementing government policy of training 150 
GPs a year would make a substantial difference but should 
healthcare policy focus on increasing use of primary care this 
number would need to increase further. 
 
•  Analysis shows that a substantial proportion of resources in Irish 
outpatient care are expended on monitoring and maintaining 
chronic health conditions that could be just as successfully 
managed and much more cheaply managed in primary care.  
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• The HSE’s preferred health system strategy is premised upon the 
reduction of average inpatient length of stay in Irish hospitals 
through the greater use of day case and particularly day surgery. 
Although the varying complexity of the case load across hospitals 
can lead to differences in day case rates, the current variability 
would suggest that there is substantial potential to increase day 
rates across the Irish hospital system and in doing so significantly 
increase the level of efficiency. 
 
• Average length of stay is also influenced by patient characteristics 
and older age and chronic illness in particular. Analysis suggests 
that the lack of step down services has a critical influence in 
reducing the efficiency of acute hospitals in Ireland, particularly 
voluntary hospitals whose patient load tends to be older and more 
likely to have disabling conditions.  
 
• The inter-dependency of health care sectors underlines the need to 
think about reform on a system-wide basis. A transition to a 
healthcare system focused more on care in the community than 
acute public hospitals will require development of both primary and 
long-stay services, as well as social care services, if it is to be 
practicable and not lead to a severe degradation in the level and 
quality of service.  
 
 
**LAYTE, R. (ed.) Projecting the Impact of Demographic Change on the Demand for 
and Delivery of Healthcare in Ireland, ESRI Research Series No. 13,  
Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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THE IRISH ‘HEALTH BASKET’:  
AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Samantha Smith* 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 
A recent paper** used what is termed the ‘health basket’ approach to 
compare publicly funded health care benefits in Ireland with those in other 
countries. The health basket describes which individuals (“breadth”), are 
covered by public funding, to what extent (“height”), and for which health 
care services (“depth”). While many international comparisons focus on the 
depth dimension, this paper focuses on the proportion of the population 
covered by publicly funded health benefits (breadth of cover) and the 
proportion of the cost covered by the public funding (height of the cover). 
The structure of the Irish health basket is compared with a sample of other 
countries frequently used as comparators (Australia, Canada, France, the 
UK and Sweden) and several distinctive features of the Irish system 
emerge. 
 
 
The range of health services directly funded by the public sector in 
Ireland is similar to that found in other countries: inpatient and outpatient 
services; general practitioner (GP) services; drugs; medical appliances; 
home nursing; home help services; dental, ophthalmic and aural services; 
rehabilitation services etc. The breadth dimension of the Irish health basket 
can be split into two categories based on medical card status. Individuals in 
Category I are issued with a medical card (approximately 30 per cent of the 
population) on the basis of a means test (although a small number are 
issued on a discretionary basis). There are two types of medical card. The 
full medical card grants access to free primary and secondary public health 
care. The GP Visit Card grants access to free GP visits only. Category II 
refers to the non medical card group and covers the rest of the population 
(approximately 70 per cent). 
 
Breadth and height of publicly funded health care vary from one service 
to another. The focus here is on GP and hospital care. Public funding for 
GP care is almost fully restricted to Category I individuals (including those 
with a GP Visit Card). GP care (in-hours and out-of-hours consultations, 
home visits) is provided free of charge to the eligible individuals and thus 
height of public cover is 100 per cent. For Category II individuals, GP care 
is not included in the benefit basket. The full-price charge imposed on this 
group is complicated by uncertainty around the pricing level. Private 
charges for GP visits are approximately €40-€60. The charges vary by GP, 
but can also vary by visit and can be hard to predict in advance. 
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 Individuals in both categories (universal breadth) are entitled to public 
hospital care (inpatient and outpatient care including day case and 
emergency department care). The height of public funding is 100 per cent 
for Category I individuals (excluding GP Visit card holders), (i.e. free access 
to public hospital care). Category II individuals (with some exceptions) are 
required to pay statutory charges (i.e. height of public cover <100 per cent).  
 
 Figure 1 illustrates the position of six countries, including Ireland, along 
the dimensions of breadth and height for GP care. The breadth of public 
cover for GP care in Ireland is narrow relative to the other countries.37 
More than 70 per cent of the population pay the full price of GP care (i.e. 
technically excluded from the health basket). In each of the other countries, 
breadth of public cover for GP care extends to the whole population. The 
height of public cover is 100 per cent in Ireland, as in the UK and Canada. 
The minimum height of cover in Australia, Sweden and France is estimated 
to be >75 per cent although many people are eligible for a higher level of 
cover.  
Figure 1: Height and Breadth Dimensions of Health Baskets for GP Care  
(% Coverage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public cover of secondary care in Ireland is broader than in primary 
care. Public funding for public inpatient care is available for all individuals 
(universal breadth) in the six countries (Figure 2). Care is provided free of 
charge in the UK, Canada and Australia (100 per cent height). The 
minimum estimated height of cover is >90 per cent in Sweden and France 
and approximately >80 per cent in Ireland, increasing to 100 per cent for 
eligible individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 This conclusion would remain valid even if the analysis were extended to take into 
account tax relief on expenditures such as GP fees.  
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Figure 2: Height and Breadth Dimensions of Health Baskets for Public 
Hospital Inpatient Care (% Coverage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The health basket provides a useful framework for describing and 
examining the main features of a health care system. Cross-country 
comparisons of health baskets have focused on variations in depth and the 
content of detailed benefit catalogues. The above analysis illustrates how 
the basket framework is also useful for comparing across countries in terms 
of who is eligible to receive what public services (i.e. breadth), and at what 
price (i.e. height). The response of the Irish health care system to questions 
of how a health service should be financed, who should have access to it, 
and at what price, has been described as complex. Until now, there has 
been less attention paid to unpicking and documenting the nature of that 
complexity and the health basket facilitates this process.  
 
While the breadth and depth of public cover is relatively consistent 
across hospital and GP care in a sample of countries including Australia, 
Canada, France, Sweden and the UK, this is not observed in the Irish 
structure. Breadth of public cover for GP care is lower than in the 
comparison countries. The limited breadth of public cover for GP care has 
important policy implications in light of the observation that primary care 
is the appropriate setting to meet 90-95 per cent of all health and personal 
social service needs, and policy commitments that primary care is to 
become the central focus of the health system. 
 
It is also important to remember that the way in which health care 
systems function in practice can diverge from their intended structures. 
The focus here is on examining the structure of the Irish health basket as 
outlined in legislation and policy. Practical implementation of the basket of 
health care services introduces other complications (e.g. supply side factors, 
tax reliefs etc.) that further complicate the breadth and height of cover, and 
distinguish the Irish system from other countries. International 
comparisons of health baskets need to take into account this divergence 
between intention and implementation. 
 
**SMITH, S., 2009. “The Irish ‘health basket’: a basket case?”, European 
Journal of Health Economics, online edition, DOI 10.1007/s10198-009-0171-4 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/j47t070m6w733p0q/?p=c10392a3dab44be7
a7af419c16fba30d&pi=14 
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John Walsh 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 Unemployment has risen sharply during the current recession –  from 4.5 
per cent at the end of 2007 to 12.5 per cent in November 2009, with 
forecasts for 2010 in the region of 15 per cent. When unemployment last 
reached these levels, long-term unemployment also rose sharply. 
Preventing long-term unemployment is important from both economic and 
social perspectives, especially because long-term unemployment tends to 
lead to erosion of skills and self-confidence, and damages future 
employment prospects. Effective prevention depends on being able to 
identify those at risk of becoming long-term unemployed at an early stage, 
and referring them to appropriate labour market programmes to improve 
their chances of obtaining employment. This was the motivation for a 
recently published ESRI report38 which developed a statistical profiling 
model for Ireland that would identify those individuals with a high risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed. 
 
 Over the last decade or so, a growing number of public employment 
services around the world have begun to develop statistical profiling 
systems to identify and target their scarce re-employment resources at those 
jobseekers in greatest need. Statistical profiling is a tool whereby a 
numerical probability score, calculated on the basis of multivariate 
regression, determines the referral of an unemployed person to further 
employment services. Specifically, the score derived ranks each individual 
in terms of his/her risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Public 
employment service staff can then use this score to identify those who are 
most in need of their assistance to help prevent them becoming long-term 
unemployed. Overall, the main objective in using statistical profiling is to 
deliver intensive services early rather than after long-term unemployment 
has already occurred. It is important to note that a profiling system can 
only be successful in preventing those identified as being at risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed from falling into this trap if it is 
combined with delivery of targeted training and employment programmes 
 
∗philip.oconnell@esri.ie; seamus.mcguinness@esri.ie; elish.kelly@esri.ie; 
john.walsh@esri.ie 
38 O’Connell, P.J., S. McGuinness, S., E. Kelly and J. Walsh, 2009. National Profiling of the 
Unemployed in Ireland. ESRI Research Series No. 10, Dublin: Economic and Social Research 
Institute.  
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that are known to be effective in enhancing the employment prospects of 
their participants.  
 
In relation to Ireland, the central objective in developing a profiling 
model is to provide the Department of Social and Family Affairs (DSFA) 
with a framework that will enable them to estimate an individual’s 
likelihood of remaining on the Live Register after twelve months. The 
DSFA can then use the measure that is produced by the profiling model to 
both identify  jobseekers that require immediate re-employment services 
and refer them for programmes designed to enhance their chances of 
securing employment. This type of intervention system would be in stark 
contrast to that currently operated under the National Employment Action 
Plan (NEAP) whereby all individuals are referred by the DSFA to FÁS, the 
national employment and training agency, for assistance after a three-
month unemployment spell. 
 
 The data used in the study came from the Live Register database and 
from a specially designed survey administered to all individuals in the 
Republic of Ireland that claimed unemployment benefit over a thirteen 
week period between September and December 2006. The information 
gathered in the survey related to a number of factors that are believed to 
influence subsequent employment prospects. This included information on 
an individual’s educational attainment, literacy and numeracy proficiency, 
previous employment and unemployment history, health status, location, 
etc. The DSFA administered the survey and also tracked the subsequent 
status of profiled claimants over a fifteen month period. A total of 60,189 
individuals made claims for unemployment benefit between September and 
December 2006. After the elimination of duplicates, unsuccessful claimants 
and individuals failing to complete the survey questionnaire, the final 
sample used in the study consisted of 33,754 claimants.  
 
The statistical profiling models of long-term unemployment that were 
estimated from these data, for males and females separately, were found to 
be very well specified and, therefore, provide very accurate predictions of 
an individual’s likelihood of entry to long-term unemployment. The 
accuracy of the models were found to increase substantially at higher levels 
of long-term unemployment risk. Very few countries implementing 
statistical profiling release details of their models. However, comparison 
with Denmark was possible, and the Irish model was found to provide 
more accurate predictions of entry to long-term unemployment than its 
Danish equivalent.   
 
A number of individual attributes were found to be strongly associated 
with long-term unemployment risk. Specifically, the results for the male 
model indicate that the probability of remaining on the Live Register is 
associated with a recent history of long-term unemployment, previous 
participation on the Community Employment (CE) scheme, advanced age, 
number of children, relatively low education, literacy/numeracy problems, 
location in urban areas, lack of personal transport, low rates of recent 
labour market engagement, spousal earnings and geographic location. The 
results from the female model are broadly similar to those of males: the 
probability of remaining on the Live Register increases with number of 
children, literacy/numeracy difficulties, a history of unemployment and 
casual employment status. Success in finding a job, on the other hand, rises 
with third-level education, recent employment, a willingness to move for a 
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job and good health. However, some gender differences are apparent. In 
particular, females who are married or separated are less likely to leave the 
Live Register, as are those whose spouse is a high earner. The magnitude of 
the impact of children on labour market entry is also higher for females. 
Regarding location, unlike males, females appear to derive no disadvantage 
from living in an urban location. While many of the identified risk factors 
seem intuitive, the value of profiling is that it allows us to distinguish the 
importance of each and to put a weight on every factor’s role in 
determining the risk of long-term unemployment.  
 
 Economic conditions, and consequently labour market conditions as well, 
have changed radically since the data used in the ESRI study were 
collected. However, this is unlikely to undermine the accuracy and 
predictive power of the profiling model as the principal factors that 
determine long-term unemployment risk – low levels of education, history 
of long-term unemployment, literacy/numeracy problems, etc. – do not 
vary with business cycle conditions. Furthermore, the dramatic increase in 
unemployment that has taken place since the economic downturn began in 
2008 has generated enormous pressure on the capacity of all components 
of the public employment service, particularly the DSFA and FÁS. A 
profiling system, if implemented, would allow the rank ordering of those 
claiming unemployment benefits in terms of their relative risk of entry to 
long-term unemployment. This would then provide policymakers with a 
fair and rigorous basis on which to ration interventions and target them on 
those most at risk of long-term unemployment.  
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